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Preface 
These review essays were written throughout 2001, and subse-
quently published in The Royal Air Force Air Power Review. 
They are attempts to suggest and evaluate books that will 
deepen and widen our understanding of air power as a military 
and political concept. The books were selected because they 
approach the subject from different angles, at the same time as 
they bring out all-important questions that should be addressed 
by officers and civilians alike. 
I am very grateful to the Air Power Review editorial board, 
particularly the Chairman, Group Captain Peter W. Gray, and 
the Head of the Historical Branch (RAF), Seb Cox, for allowing 
this reprint. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the 
.Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy who have contributed to 
these essays. I would particularly like to mention Dr Nils 
Naastad, Mr 0istein Espenes, Mrs Patricia Aresvik, Mrs Anne-
Marie Gorset, Lieutenant Colonel Ole Jergen Maae and Major 
Morten Karlsen. Additionally, Dr H.P. Willmott and Dr Alan 
Stephens have provided both motivation and insight to the 
observations expressed in these essays. 
General (ret.) Charles Albert Horner embodies a considerable 
amount of air power history. He was awarded pilot wings in 
1959, spent two tours flying combat missions in Vietnam, was 
in charge of the American-led air campaign in Operation Desert 
Storm and ended his military career as commander-in-chief of 
the unified US Space Command (CINCSPACE) in l994. He was 
consequently in charge of perhaps the most successful air cam-
paign ever fought, and allegedly his assignment as commander 
of the Space Command proved to be a "seminal event" with 
respect to bringing the space and fighter communities closer 
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together. Although Horner has given numerous interviews, ap-
peared before Congress on several occasions and participated in 
conferences world-wide, one appreciates finding his personal 
experiences collected in one volume. He explores together with 
Tom Clancy the origin, evolution and execution of the air cam-
paign against Iraq with reflections and perspectives on the ma-
turity of the United States Air Force (USAF) and the art of air 
power on the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war-
fare. 
In The Transformation of American Air Power RAND-ana-
lyst Benjamin S. Lambeth argues that the United States has wit-
nessed, over the last two or three decades, a non-linear growth 
in air power's ability to contribute to the outcome of joint 
operations. Although many factors have played their part in this 
development, the author emphasises that air power's increased 
leverage is a result of "stealth"' precision and "stand-off" 
capabilities combined with the expanded battle space awareness 
made possible by recent developments in C4ISR (Command, 
Control, Communications and Computers - combined with 
Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). Lambeth ad-
vances his thesis by taking us on an excursion from the failures 
of Rolling Thunder to the mixed performances of Deliberate 
Force and Allied Force, via the epitome of Desert Storm. He 
does not, however, argue that air power can win wars single-
handedly, or that air power is universally applicable, but that 
recent developments have increased the relative combat poten-
tial of air power considerably in comparison to that of other 
force elements. The work is as such a timely and comprehensive 
survey that merits attention by those interested in the utility of 
contemporary aerospace power and the larger debate on defence 
investments. Lambeth's scholarly work goes neatly together 
with the personal experiences of General Horner's Every Man A 
Tiger narrative. 
In Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations Wing Commander 
Shaun Clarke examines the fundamentals of air power strategy 
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and explores the potential of offensive air power in the context 
of small-to-medium-sized defence forces. The approach is re-
freshing on at least two accounts: it provides a framework that 
goes deeply into air power theory on the one hand, and it ac-
counts for a plausible strategy outside the American setting on 
the other hand. This review essay presents the current air power 
debate on strategic thought, discusses Shaun Clarke's thesis, and 
finally provides a brief assessment of the author's contribution 
to the existing literature. In essence, the author suggests three 
propositions that ~artly change. rh: terms of re~ere~c.e on .the 
traditional perceptiOn of strategic arr power apphcab1hty. F1rst, 
"in limited war, small nations need not aspire to unconditional 
surrel,.der or the collapse of the enemy regime". Second, "the 
ultimate subject of war is the supreme decision-making body". 
Finally, "The large nation issue of air power primacy is a dis-
traction to the true root of air power success -joint strategy". 
Deriving from these propositions, Clarke arrives at his own 
strategy, "SPOT bombing", which focuses on persuasion and 
high-impact rather than the traditional concept of overwhelming 
force intending to paralyse the belligerent state. 
Group Captain Peter W. Gray, former Director of Defence 
Studies in the Royal Air Force, is the editor of Air Power 21, 
where distinguished British analysts examine air power chal-
lenges for the new century. The book is about re-evaluating air 
power strategy, accepting that overwhelming force is not the 
only viable option; it is abou,t realising that air forces must 
collaborate more intimately with surface forces and strengthen 
the combined arm; it is about moving beyond military "mirror-
imaging" and accounting for the enemy deceptions and percep-
tions; and it is about developing a profound understanding of 
the political sensitivities that are always associated with air op-
erations and the command and control challenges therein. Gray 
' . 
et al. is about political and military acumen, accepting that 
things have changed and a restructuring is required since the 
days of the Cold War, where unity of purpose and effort could 
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be taken for granted. This review essay identifies these recurring 
themes, discusses the contributions and provides a brief assess-
ment of the book as a whole. 
Colonel (ret.) John A. Warden Ill and Leland A. Russell have 
co-authored Winning in Fast Time, where they translate War-
den's ideas on air power strategy into the world of business. 
Although based on a recipe for succeeding in the commercial 
world, the work is really more about a mindset and an orienta-
tion to problem solving, and the importance of "Time", than it 
is a checklist. It is about how to think strategically rather than 
tactically, it is about how to deal with the problem rather than 
the symptoms, and it is about thinking positively rather than 
complaining about self-imposed restrictions. In essence Warden 
suggests four imperatives that should guide one's planning to 
win, whatever the business is: Design the Future; Target for Suc-
cess; Campaign to Win; and Finish with Finesse. Additionally, 
Warden and Russell develop steps that have to be taken within 
each imperative, and finally they offer twelve Cardinal Rules 
that will help you succeed. This review essay traces the genesis 
of Warden's ideas, develops a synopsis of the presented thesis, 
and finally provides a brief assessment of the book. 
John A. Olsen 
Trondheim, October 2002 
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Introduction: The Importance of 
Review Essays 
0istein Espenes 
Encyclopaedia Britannica defines an essay as "a literary 
composition of moderate length, dealing in an easy, cursory 
way with a single subject, usually representing the writer's 
personal experience and outlook". The presented essays in no 
respect deal with their subjects in an easy or cursory way, and 
contemporary air power theory can hardly be regarded as a 
single subject given its complexities. Still, this book is a collec-
tion of essays, or to be more precise, review essays, and as 
such they differ from traditional book reviews. Book reviews 
only rarely go into the thrust of the subject, seldom put the 
book in a wider perspective and have a tendency to serve as 
little more than a summary. A review essay gives a more thor-
ough examination of the publication, compares it to a larger 
extent with existing literature, and thus becomes a method for 
dealing with the wider debate of the subject at hand. It be-
comes a tool for scrutinising literature. These review essays, 
therefore, allow for a scholarly founded analysis of recent 
publications on military theory generally and air power theory 
specifically. Such a systematic approach to this kind of litera-
ture is necessary for several reasons. 
The Anglo-American sphere dominates current writing 
on modern air power theory. Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand provide several interesting analyses, but the Ameri-
cans dominate the field. Although quite a few American 
contributions in the field should be acknowledged, the Ameri-
can dominance reveals certain problems. Given the fact that 
all writing, and interpretation of history, is culturally founded 
and contextual, there is a danger in allowing one nation to 
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dominate the literature to such an extent as is the case here. 
The American culture is one, which tends to seek formulas for 
success, and therein lies the fundamental belief that military 
action is a scientific action that can largely be scripted. The 
Western world in general tends to treat military strategy, the-
ory and doctrine as something that has a normative function. 
The last decades' military thinkers, often with the Vietnam 
War as a point of reference, have praised Clausewitz for re-
garding prescriptions as secondary to analysis, but the West-
ern literature seems, nevertheless, to have a desire to fulfil 
Jomini's vision of a universal and simple guide to the conduct 
of war. One should not blame officers for such inclinations, 
because the yearning to overcome the uncertainty in wars is 
understandable. Academics, on the other hand, however pain-
ful it may be, have a duty to create acceptance for the fact that 
there probably is no such thing as a general recipe for con-
ducting war and employing air power. Niklas Zetterling, a 
Swedish author, provides a revealing dissection of John A. 
Warden's The Air Campaign - one of the most influential 
books on air power in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Zetter-
ling reveals both analytical and empirical mistakes to such a 
degree that his conclusion questions Warden's academic integ-
rity. One may speculate that Warden's book became so 
popular simply because it dealt with air power theory in such 
an "easy, cursory way": he wrote what airmen wanted to 
hear, and most readers did not take the time to research the 
matter more closely. The Zetterling case reveals an intercon-
nected problem: he wrote his review essay in Swedish rather 
than in English and thus reached only a limited audience. It 
does not reduce the importance of the essay, but in order to 
enter the wider debate one needs to communicate in the lan-
guage that dominates the field. 
Another reason for appreciating Major Olsen's collec-
tion of review essays is that they give room for a discussion on 
the selected authors' positions along broader lines within the 
debate on air power. A large-meshed categorisation has been 
to examine whether an author belongs to the Douhetian tradi-
tion of strategic bombing or the Guderian and Wever tradi-
tion of integrating land- and air power. Or, more generally, is 
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the author advocating an "air power alone" solution, or pro-
moting "joint" operations? In the current debate one seems to 
· focus on the theories of strategic paralysis - attack the enemy 
leader directly, or denial - target the opponent's military 
forces. Thus, the current debate on how best to apply air 
power has a bipolar foundation that is rather extreme, and as 
a consequence much research in the field is artificially canal-
ised along these lines. Moreover, both these categories for 
strategy require means beyond small air power nation 
capabilities. Although one should be careful when generalis-
ing, the dominating views are not easily applicable to all coun-
tries. Such categorisation can seem rather simplistic, but an 
attempt to reveal the authors' basic beliefs allows us to discuss 
the deeper socio-political outlook on which the various air 
power theories are based. 
Review essays give busy {not to say lazy) readers the 
chance to keep up with the l;;ttest extensive production of air 
power literature, and they keep readers updated on the cur-
rent debates within the field. The very nature of review essays 
does of course have disadvantages: you place your trust in the 
essay writer and his interpretation. Consequently, misconcep-
tions rather than enlightenment may be the result. Review 
essays cannot, therefore, serve as a substitute for the books 
they seek to comment on - they are first and foremost sup-
plements. 
One final point to be made is that air power as a 
phenomenon has often been associated with aircraft, and thus 
of interest mostly to pilots and engineers. Air power as a mili-
tary partner then became something that was primarily dis-
cussed within the defence community. It is only relatively re-
cently that air power has reached such a wide audience and 
become an academic discipline at some universities. This is of 
course a consequence of the fact that air power has become 
the favourite military tool for the USA and NATO. But with 
the changing nature of warfare that seems to be in the making, 
one can only hope that officers, academics and politicians 
alike gain a more balanced and informed picture of what air 
po~er can and cannot do. To such an end, review essays play 
an Important part in probing and understanding current lit-
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erature that may in turn be the basis on which the politicians 
make their decisions. This publication by Major John Olsen is 
a valuable contribution. 
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Chapter I 
Tom Clancy with General 
Chuck Horner: Every Man a 
Tiger: The Gulf War Air Cam-
paign (1999) 
The Legacy of Vietnam 
The Vietnam War remains a distressing memory for Chuck 
Horner, and in "The Big Lie" he provides severe criticism of the 
operations in which he participated.' He argues that the 
Washington administration did not have a clear objective of 
what it wanted to achieve with air power, and that the chosen 
Graduated Pressure strategy essentially asked the military to 
fight with its hands tied. The pilots were given politically se-
lected targets, the rules of engagement prevented them from 
hitting the enemy where it hurt, they were not allowed to take 
initiatives on their own, and combined with target exclusion 
zones air power was prohibited from being used in an effective 
manner. Numbers of sorties and bombs dropped were hopeless 
measures of merit and the critical airfields north of Hanoi were 
off-limit for political reasons, thereby allowing MiGs and criti-
cal surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites sanctuaries. Although 
Horner accepts that there are always legitimate higher priorities 
than your master air campaign plan, and that the military strat-
1This review is a reprint of John Andreas Olsen, The Royal Air Force Air 
Power Review, Volume 4, Number Three, Autumn 2001, pp. 82-89. 
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egy had to be devised in order not to provoke the Soviet Union 
and China into war, he argues that it was mere stupidity not to 
attack the SA-2s that were overtly brought in by train from 
China and ships from the Soviet Union. The Americans were 
not allowed to attack SA-2s that were being set up, or MiGs 
that prepared for take-off, unless they were fired at first. Homer 
also faults the generals for having conducted the war inade-
quately and for not having stood up to their political masters. 
On the lower levels of war he argues that there were un-
healthy rivalry between commands and services, where one of 
the consequences was the Route Package system wherein no 
single commander had the overall responsibility for air assets. 
The US forces were consequently not mutually supportive, much 
of the tactics did not make sense and "the enemy could easily 
take advantage of the split in U.S. forces".2 To cite one example 
on failed tactics, Homer argues that there was a belief in 1965 
that SAMs were 100% effective. Consequently they had to 
avoid the radar detec!ion zone, but the Strategic Air Command's 
doctrine subscribed that the large numbers of jets had to fly in 
trail over the target- "bomber stream tactics". The result was 
that the anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) proved far more lethal to 
low-level flying than the SAMs did in the first place. Addition-
ally, as long as the Americans had to follow a scripted plan they 
were not only predictable to the North Vietnamese, but easy 
targets- "ducks in a row". Only when tactics were changed and 
the combined effect of the Wild Weasel and Electronic Counter 
Measure (ECM) Pods were introduced during his second tour to 
Vietnam did the SAM threat become manageable. 
Homer uses strong words in describing his hatred for 
the generals, admirals and politicians who were responsible for 
the loss of some 58,000 American lives in a conflict that resulted 
in several million being killed: 
If I had to be a killer, I wanted to know why I was killing; 
and the facts didn't match the rhetoric coming out of Wash-
ington [ ... ] They just did not know what they wanted to do 
2Tom Clancy with General Chuck Horner, Every Man a Tiger, (G. P. 
Putnam's Sons: New York, 1999), p. 88. 
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[ ... ] they came up with strategies almost on a day-to-day basis 
[ ... ] Our generals were bad news[ ... ] I hated my own generals 
because they covered up their own gutless inability to stand 
up to the political masters in Washington [ ... ] We taught our 
enemy to endure air attacks, we taught our enemy how to 
best defend against the world's greatest air power, and we 
taught our enemy how to defeat us in the end [ ... ] I lied [ ... ] I 
stripped myself of integrity [ ... ] I learned that you cannot 
trust America [ ... ] The result was that we were living a lie and 
had lost our pride [ ... ] The policy of Vietnamization was a 
sham [ ... ] We had become a Communist nation within the 
very organization that was to protect our nation from the 
threat of communism. 3 
Although some of these lessons have become compulsory read-
ing in air power courses they are important as they shaped the 
mindset and focus that Homer brought with him when he pre-
pared and led the air campaign in 1991. The first part of the 
book shows how the concepts of air power developed in 
Horner's mind. 
In the aftermath of Vietnam the US military went 
through several reforms in order to improve their training, tech-
nology and concepts of operations. Homer shows his disgust for 
the so-called "Management Computation System" and praise 
for the exercise programmes that aimed at training the way you 
planned to fight. By the mid 1970s the USAF started to focus on 
the enemy actions and on "time" as war-winning factors, rather 
than scripted combat orders and procedures. Both "Aggressor 
Training" and "Red Flag" were exercises in dealing with Soviet 
tactics and doctrine that derived from the so-called "Fighter 
Mafia", a party to which Homer belonged. The group believed 
that the Cold War paradigm of air power solely as a bomber 
force with nuclear weapons did not account for what air power 
could do as a war-fighting and war-supporting instrument. This 
period witnessed the introduction of the F-15 and the lighter 
and more manoeuvrable F-16- Horner's favourite aircraft. 
Although these initiatives were important in reforming 
the USAF and bringing it out of the doctrinal doldrums of the 
3Ibid, pp. 96-98 and 156. 
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Vietnam era, Horner stresses that motivation and sound leader-
ship represents the cradle of productivity and success. He argues 
that the growing discipline, pride and belief in one's own profes-
sion came with individuals such as Generals Bill Kirk (Ninth Air 
Force Commander) and Wilber Creech. With the latter ap-
pointed commander of the Tactical Air Command (TAC) in 
1978 truth, honesty and operational efficiency came together 
and gradually the air power dictum of "centralised control and 
decentralised execution" was implemented. The implications of 
the authors' observations are that the USAF witnessed the re-
demption from the Vietnam mistakes as it systematically sought 
to mitigate its shortcomings. When dedicated generalship was 
combined with the huge investments in military assets during 
the Carter and Reagan administrations the USAF came of age 
with the liberation of Kuwait. Horner argues that they "had to 
learn how to be an Air Force all over again", and in that process 
the two elements - the intellectual and the material - were part 
and parcel. 
Preparing for the Next Battle 
In the second part of the book Horner takes the reader into the 
personalities and intricacies of the US military command during 
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. As commander of the Ninth Air 
Force and Central Command Air Force (CENT AF) he was Gen-
eral Schwarzkopf's air component commander in the Gulf re-
gion. While much has already been written about the early days 
of the crisis, Horner argues that there are two aspects that are 
imperative to understand the success of the air campaign. The 
first is personal relations and trust between commanders. 
Horner had gone to the National War College together with 
General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
and Lieutenant General John Yeosack, CENTCOM's ground 
component commander, from August 1975 to June 1976. 
Additionally, the co-operation with the other component 
commanders during the crisis over Kuwait, Major General Wai-
ter Boomer and Vice Admiral Stan Atthur, worked superbly: 
"Unless you understand our relationships, then you really won't 
understand what went on in Desert Storm, all the good and bad 
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- and there was plenty of each" .4 Horner also managed to get 
good working relationships with several Arab military leaders, 
such as the commander of the Saudi Arabian Air Force, General 
Ahmed Behery, throughout the three years he had been assigned 
to the region. 
The second imperative in understanding the success of 
the 1991 air campaign according to the authors is the concepts 
of operations that Horner introduced to Schwarzkopf in April 
1990 in preparation for Exercise Internal Look - a mock war 
against "Country Orange" (Iraq). The air campaign planning 
did as such start well over a year before 2 August 1990, when 
Powell and Schwarzkopf acknowledged that the Americans 
were no longer fighting the Russians and that they had to plan 
for regional contingency in which Iraq was perceived as the 
main aggressor. In his briefing to Schwarzkopf Horner empha-
sised what he thought was important in order for air power to 
be effective. Firstly, he stressed that there should be a single air 
component commander so that all air assets were integrated into 
an overall war plan rather than operating with separate areas of 
responsibilities for the different services, as had been the case 
with "Rout Packs" in Vietnam. Secondly, Horner argued that it 
was unnecessary to build a new air defence system in the region 
since the Saudi Arabian Air Force solution was adequate. The 
challenge was rather how to integrate American forces with the 
existing infrastructure and pre-positioned material. Thirdly, 
Horner talked about defence against the Scuds, and together 
with Yeosack he argued that the Patriot was a suitable counter 
measure. Fourthly, Horner explained how he thought air power 
could support the Army in a fluid manoeuvre battle, and herein 
he introduced the concept of Push Close Air Support (Push 
CAS).5 Finally, in the event of a chemical threat Horner sug-
gested that several targets deep inside the Iraqi homeland should 
be attacked either to prevent him from using chemical weapons 
4
"Ten years after", United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, January 
2001. 
'Push CAS: "aircraft would be designated for CAS, but where, how, and 
when they would be used would be determined "on the run" by events in 
the field". Clancy with Homer (1999), p. 21. 
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or in retaliation to prevent further use. Horner's idea was that 
such an offensive would not be executed if Saddam Hussein was 
forced to keep his "chemicals in the barn" .6 The April briefing 
was important in several respects, but first and foremost 
Schwarzkopf came to trust Horner. Although the posture of 
Internal Look was much more defensive than the actual combat 
would be, there were several organisational, administrative and 
logistical matters that were dealt with or tested in July 1990. 
This would bear fruit a few months later during the real crisis 
since the main military commanders had the opportunity to 
work with each other. As history would have it Iraq invaded 
Kuwait before the new contingency plan (OPLAN 1002-90) was 
finished, and Schwarzkopf turned to Horner when the 
CENTCOM joint planning staff (J-3) proved incompetent in 
briefing an air option to the President at Camp David. Schwarz-
kopf admitted that he was no expert on air power, but he 
showed Horner full ~onfidence. As it turned out he would 
arguably have a better relationship with Schwarzkopf than the 
Chief-in-Command (CINC) would have with many of his own 
Army commanders. Schwarzkopf chose in the end, as Eisen-
hower and MacArthur had done before him, to use air power to 
its fullest, even if he had the traditional view that wars are really 
decided on the ground. 7 
One of the qualities of Chuck Horner is his ability to be 
pragmatic: to network and provide his leadership with what it 
needs. He is also impressively observant and known for accept-
ing new ideas as long as he is convinced that it is for the better 
of the cause. Against this background there has been much 
speculation to why he did not accept Colonel John A. Warden 
as part of his team. As it happened, since Horner was busy 
managing the bed-down in Saudi Arabia in early-mid August 
1990, and Schwarzkopf did not trust his own staff in developing 
an air option, he approached the Air Staff. The response, Instant 
Thunder, which sought to impose strategic paralysis on Iraq, 
6Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, interview with Lieutenant Colonels 
Suzanne Gehri and Richard Reynolds, "The Desert Story Collection", 2 
December 1991, p. 6. 
7Richard P. Hallion, correspondence with author, 23 February 2001. 
AIR POWER 2000 17 
was developed by Warden's team in "Checkmate" and pre-
sented to Powell, Schwarzkopf and Horner. The former two 
found it attractive but Horner rejected it summarily. Horner 
found that Warden was "very intelligent", "a brilliant tar-
geteer" and even a "genius" on some aspects of air power the-
ory, but he found that he was "difficult to reason with" and 
that the briefing was flawed in several respects." 
In order to understand the dispute one must realise that 
at the time Horner was faced with 27 Iraqi divisions on the Ku-
waiti border of Saudi Arabia and without any ground forces in 
defence. The stated mission was to defend Saudi Arabia and 
Horner's major concern was to develop a defensive air cam-
paign plan that could deal with the imminent Iraqi threat. War-
den, for his part, believed that if they went directly for key tar-
gets in Baghdad the Iraqi ground forces would prove irrelevant. 
Horner found Warden one-dimensional in his focus on leader-
ship targets in Baghdad and did not find that he could rely on 
an offensive air campaign alone in coercing the Iraqi leadership 
to withdraw from Kuwait. Moreover, Horner found that open-
ing the air campaign with a substantial attack on a major Arab 
capital without having fully tested the new technology of stealth 
and precision was partly a gamble, because if the precision-
guided missiles did not perform well it could jeopardise Ameri-
can-Arab relations for decades to come. Horner also felt that 
Warden went too far in his suggestion of degrading Iraqi air 
bases and its command-and-control structure. In essence the air 
commander concluded that Warden was too academic, optimis-
tic and broad in his approach to what air power could do rather 
than consider operational details and account for the non-linear 
and unscientific reality of air operations. Finally, Horner did not 
disagree with Warden that it was preferable to have Saddam 
Hussein overthrown, but he was not ready to commit to such 
intent without having the political acumen of conducting the 
actual replacement. In the end Horner chose to keep some of the 
ideas, as he decided to establish a strategic planning cell with the 
mandate of developing an executable offensive option. On bal-
8See also Tom Clancy, Fighter Wing: A Guided Tour of an Air Force 
Combat Wing, (New York: Berkley Books, 1995), pp. 35-60. 
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ance Warden's effort was the genesis of what became the strate-
gic air campaign, Phase I of Operation Desert Storm, which was 
subsequently developed by a team led by Lieutenant Colonel 
David Deptula who became the key air campaign planner in the 
"Black Hole". Deptula made sure that the essence of the strate-
gic focus envisioned in Instant Thunder was upheld throughout 
the planning, while at the same time incorporating Horner's 
larger concerns into building the actual attack plans. 
The Air Campaign 
One of the air power questions that have taken centre stage in 
the debate after Operation Desert Storm is whether "strategic 
bombardment works"! Although there is little consensus on 
~ha_t _the term implies; the concept of operations has departed 
s1gmf1cantly from the 1mages of Dresden and Tokyo during the 
Second World War. The "Checkmate" and "Black Hole" air 
planners believed that the leadership of Saddam Hussein was the 
true centre of gravity, and thus all efforts should be brought to 
bear against his regime through the combination of stealth and 
prec!sion. Horner argues that the precision attacks against the 
Iraq1 command, control and communication targets in Baghdad 
were a huge success as far as the military strategy of gaining air 
supremacy was concerned, but that they failed miserably in dis-
rupting the Iraqi leadership. Horner argues that Americans did 
not know how to use military power in order to overthrow the 
regime, and that they failed to understand that the Baath Party 
and Saddam Hussein could not be considered as one entity. He 
ar~ues that that because they assumed "mirror imaging" they 
failed to understand the nature of a regime governed through 
fear: 
The American planners failed to change the government of 
Iraq, because they did not understand how the government 
operated, and therefore how to attack it. They did not under-
stand that Saddam stayed in power by creating an aura of cri-
9For an account arguing that strategic bombing does not work, see for 
example Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). ' 
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sis that caused his people to need him more than they needed 
change. The fear that motivated the average Iraqi citizen's 
loyalty to Saddam was beyond their comprehension, because 
they had never experienced life under a repressive regime. 
They did not understand that they needed to target the fear, 
and that they did not have either the smarts or the intelligence 
analysis to destroy the hold of fear on the Iraqi people. They 
did not understand that the bombing of Iraq ensured that 
hold was increased and not decreased. 10 
Although many of these observations are valid one has to take 
issue with Horner's condemnation of this aspect of the strategic 
air campaign. It was never a declared objective to overthrow the 
Iraqi regime, and although a number of air planners hoped that 
the Iraqi leader would get killed, there was never a targeting 
focus that amounted to a "hunt for Saddam Hussein". The ob-
jective was to incapacitate rather than decapitate, and to state 
that one aspect of an overall effort "failed miserably" for not 
having achieved an objective that was not declared is seemingly 
unfair. Moreover, as it turned out, a significant number of Iraqis 
deserted and defected, and an unprecedented uprising against 
the Iraqi regime took place in the immediate aftermath. What 
part of the war actually triggered this mass movement is not 
easy to define, but there is no reason to conclude that the 
bombing of the Iraqi leadership had nothing to do with this. A 
considerable number of Iraqis chose to leave Baghdad at the 
beginning of the bombing, and as these were mainly middle- and 
upper class citizens it is reasonable to suggest that menace and 
uncertainty reduced the efficiency of the Iraqi state apparatus. 
The strategic air campaign ensured fog and friction on the stra-
tegic level of war, as Saddam Hussein was forced to operate 
from second- and third-rate command and control centres in the 
outskirts of Baghdad. He had to operate in an "underground" 
fashion, and some of the Iraqi accounts indicate that the upris-
ing and defection was partly a result of them not knowing 
whether Saddam Hussein was dead or alive. The Iraqi leader 
and the Baath Party's lack of presence combined with the fact 
10Clancy with Homer (1999), p. 374. 
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that any target in Baghdad could be bombed at will may have 
presented a vulnerability to the Iraqi people that gave them con-
fidence enough to conclude that if they rebelled they would be 
on the winning side. To argue that the disruption of the com-
mand, control and communication system was reasonably 
successful while the bombing of government buildings proved 
ineffective could be contested, since leadership and command, 
control and communication can be considered as one entity. 
Furthermore, there is a good chance of a lucky strike when one 
goes for the core of an enemy's instruments of power, and as 
long as the leadership targets were visited by only a few per cent 
of the overall bombing tonnage one might suggest that it was 
worthwhile. Indeed, one might argue that not bombing regime 
targets could be perceived as lacking resolve. Finally, interviews 
with Iraqis indicate that Saddam Hussein has never been as 
weak as he was during the Intifada of March and April 1991, 
and thus only marginal efforts would have been required by the 
Coalition to overthrow the Iraqi leader at the timeY It is im-
mensely difficult to assess the. effectiveness of the strategic air 
campaign, but there is good reason to believe that Phase I con-
tributed to the Iraqi regime being incapable of functioning as a 
strategic entity and consequently the Iraqi strategy was under-
mined. 
Horner can to a much larger degree identify with Phase 
Ill of Operation Desert Storm, the unprecedented offensive air 
campaign against Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait. The objective 
was to prepare and partly destroy the battlefield so the Coalition 
ground forces would meet as little resistance as possible in their 
endeavour. The campaign was a huge success by most standards 
of measure, and as Horner goes into the actual execution one 
can derive several tactical imperatives that had operational 
significance. The A-10 is much praised for its role in deep-
interdiction and reconnaissance, but Horner argues that it took 
so many hits from the Republican Guard forces that it had to 
concentrate on the less capable Iraqi troops on the front line. 
11 Captain John Andreas Olsen, "Operation Desert Storm: An Examination 
of the Strategic Air Campaign", Ph .D. submitted to De Montfort University, 
March2000. 
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S dl much praise was given to the F-16 killer scout opera-econ y, E b·1· h" 
· the Push CAS system and F-111s and F-15 sa 11ty to it 
tJOnS, . k" , Add" . 11 th tanks at will - the so-called "tank phn mg : 1t10na y, e 
"shelter-busting" proved successful, and so d1d the use of cock-
it videotape as a source of intelligen~e. C~mbat Search and ~escue is, however, a role that Horner fm~s madc:quately hand-
led and urges future commanders to consider senously. Horn~r 
also provides a brief account of the ground battle and au 
power's support of the ground commander's scheme of manoe~-
Although Horner secretly hoped that Saddam Hussem :~;ud surrender without a ?round battle he showed 100 per 
cent commitment in supportmg the army endeavour. After t_he 
successful conclusion he would of course use eveiy oppo~tumty 
to refer to the ground war as the 10 per cent war smce 1t 
amounted to only 100 hours of battle as opposed to 1,000 
hours of air operations. 
Overall Assessment 
General Horner would have been fully capable of wri~ing this 
book on his own but he chose to write it together w1th Tom 
Clancy. The style' does naturally reflect this, at the expense ~f 
being more scholarly or academically narrated, but Horner s 
choice was considered closely: "I wanted to tell the story about 
· ower but I didn't want to lecture people. Let the story 
a1rp , . d d 
come out of the anecdotes. The other thmg I :wante to o w~s 
create some romance, some passion about thmgs that go on m 
the military. So it goes well beyond airplanes and _bom_bs and 
strategy and national policy" .12 With this purpose m mmd ~e 
objective of the book has been achieved and the partnership 
with Clancy makes sense. There is, however, much m~re about 
the history of air power that Horner could hav~ c~ntrlbuted to 
as a primary and authoritative source, but wh1ch IS only d~alt 
with in brevity. An obvious point here would be the runnmg 
battles between him and the army corps commanders on 
whether one should target deep or at the front. Another would 
12Jnterview withJamie Allen, CNN Interactive Senior Writer, "Tom Clancy, 
General Chuck Horn er return to Desert Storm", . 
www.cnn.com/books/news/9905!12/clancy.hornerl-hsmdex.html 
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be the air-ground bickering which resulted in the Republican 
Guard being allowed to escape to Basra partly because of the 
restrictive Fire Support Co-ordination Line (FSCL) at the end of 
the war. As it stands one has to go through a novel-style story 
telling, and although that is great in some respects, one has to 
search harder to get to the real heart of Horner's messages. 
Other than where Horner is directly speaking in his own words 
it is difficult to know whether we are getting Clancy's or 
Horner's opinion. While the effect of the Clancy partnership is 
that the informative discussions reach a wider audience than one 
would normally find for a book on air power, a point that 
should not be missed, it also lessens the value of the study as a 
contribution to historical records and academic research. 
One might disagree with some of the authors' conclu-
sions, and one might speculate that Horner exaggerates certain 
points in order to provoke and force people to think. On bal-
ance the book is both interesting and perceptive as it takes the 
reader through the debacles of Vietnam and the planning, 
development and implementation of the air campaign, with 
added assessment of what went well and not so well. The book 
provides several interesting aspects of the operational art of air 
power and how, when politics, parochialism and cultural 
sensitivities are considered, it becomes the art of the possible. 
The sophisticated and complex world of technology, weaponry 
and tactics is easily explained, and we get useful insight into the 
difficulty of running a coalition. The account traces the 
organisational, technological and doctrinal improvements of the 
USAF, as air power rose from the misfortune of South East Asia 
to the victory over Iraq two decades later. It is therefore rather 
comprehensive as it deals with the implications of that experi-
ence, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the conception of 
the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force that resulted in the 
command system of the 1990s. The book touches upon issues 
like the problem of rotating personnel, the air tasking order and 
the challenges in battle damage assessment, in addition to 
thoughts on how Desert Storm was not a revolution in military 
affairs, but rather a vindication of the changes that had occurred 
in technology prior to and during the Reagan administration. 
We also get to see the human and emotional side of the air 
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commander. We are told that he is deeply religious, that he 
experienced near death in 1962, how he helped a Vietnamese 
family settle in the United States and how he felt personal 
responsibility for pilots who died under his command. He talks 
about the importance of family and friends, and these serious 
considerations are further entwined with humorous anecdotes, 
sharp critique and praise of colleagues, insight into the Arab 
culture, and perceptive thoughts on tactical and operational 
issues. Horner tells us about his daily concerns during his com-
mand and how he managed chaos, and importantly one gets a 
picture of how important logistics and organisation matters are 
in succeeding with air power. Although as a fighter pilot he 
could have maintained a focus on the sharp end of combat he 
chooses to provide a rather exhaustive view of what air power is 
in its widest sense. The way Horner contextualises air power 
from first hand experience is an important contribution to the 
available literature on both air power and the Gulf War. Horner 
is blunt and honest in his conclusions on what air power can 
and cannot do, and some readers will certainly disagree with the 
Airman's view, but Horner would not want it any other way as 
he does not claim to have all the answers. 
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Chapter II 
Benjamin S. Lambeth: The 
Transformation of American 
Air Power (2000) 
From Rolling Thunder to Desert Storm 
Rather than perceive air power as synonymous with bombs, 
Lambeth stresses that "in its totality, air power is a complex 
amalgam of hardware and less tangible but equally important 
ingredients bearing on its effectiveness, such as employment 
doctrine, concepts of operations, training, tactics, proficiency, 
leadership, adaptability, and practical experience" Y With this 
definition in mind, the author's point of departure is that air 
power failed miserably in Vietnam, but that it is insufficient to 
accept the classic air power advocate argument that the misuse 
should be attributed to the limits on air power rather than limits 
of air power. Although the micro-management of Lyndon B. 
Johnson and Robert McNamara had a degrading effect on the 
application of air power, the author argues that there were 
organisational problems within the military force that did not 
allow it to be effective, and that there were considerable short-
comings in equipment, training, doctrine and operational profi-
ciency that have to be accounted for in the overall assessment. 
13Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 9. This review is a reprint of 
John Andreas Olsen, The Royal Air Force Air Power Review, Volume 4, 
Nwnber Four, Winter 2001, pp. 150·157. 
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The air weapon was largely ill-suited in the proxy-fed war of 
insur~ency i? South Vietnam and the Rolling Thunder campaign 
was meffectJ.ve partly as a result of self-deceiving measures of 
effectiveness and needlessly self-imposed operational restrictions 
that hampered aerial combat and exposed aircraft to the North 
Vietn~'_llese surface-to-air missile threat. Lambeth argues that 
the military commanders have to share the responsibility for the 
outcome as there was an unhealthy inter-service rivalry that 
among other things resulted in fragmented command and con-
tra~ .a~rangements. Moreover, through "mirror-imaging" the 
pohtJ.c1ans, generals and admirals misinterpreted not only the 
determination of the enemy, but also the whole nature of the 
war at hand.14 Lambeth provides an interesting account of the 
Vietnam experience, and most importantly he demonstrates its 
influence on the 1991 campaign: "It put all four services on a 
vector to perfect their air assets during the two decades that 
spanned Vietnam and Desert Storm".15 Indeed, several improve-
ments that were to be the hallmark in 1991 originated with the 
Linebacker campaigns:. Laser-guided precision bombs (LGB) 
were t~sted, the •:tank-plinking" idea was conceived, improve-
ments m electromc warfare were found, the Vietnamese air de-
f:nce syst_em was largely suppressed, and finally, an integrated 
arr offensive based on a plausible strategy and reasonable rules 
of engagements (ROE) was largely executed with an acceptable 
operational outcome. 
The Vietnam experience, combined with the results of 
the Yom Kippur War of 1973, where Israel lost one-third of its 
air force in the combined Arab attack, and the increased mobili-
sation of Soviet forces during the "Second Cold War" led to a 
period of reform in the American military. Lambeth discusses 
how the United States improved its air posture over the subse-
quent _years by describing the changes in USAF training and 
educatJ.on, the modernisation of aircraft and equipment inven-
tory, ~nd the refining of American doctrine and concepts of 
operatJ.ons. All these three elements played an important role in 
"See particularly Mark A. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The 
Amencan Bombing of North Vietnam, (New York: Free Press 1989). 
"Lambeth (2000), p. 53. ' 
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forming the air power capabilities witnessed in the 1990s and 
according to Lambeth the incorporation of leading-edge tech-
nology made for a quantum leap in operational efficiency. The 
author discusses the introduction of new aircraft, pays attention 
to the partnership between the USAF Tactical Air Command 
(TAC) and the US Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) 
centre, and assesses the utility of the Air-Land Forces Applica-
tion (ALFA), AirLand Battle Doctrine and the Follow-On Force 
Attack (FOFA) plan. Although these concepts in theory gave the 
Army and the Air Force a common basis for planning through 
the "31 Initiatives",16 the author identifies a substantial lack of 
understanding between the two parties. 
Lambeth discusses how the USAF improved its inventory 
and concepts of operations throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
but the author does not deal with the "Fighter Mafia" and the 
"Military Reform Movement" explicitly. The development of 
the technologically sophisticated F-15 and the more manoeu-
vrable F-16, combined with Colonel John R. Boyd's role therein, 
deserves consideration. One side argues that the Movement was 
critical of the very technology that makes air power and thus 
largely irrelevant in the wider defence debate, while the other 
side argues that John Boyd, William S. Lind, Norman Polmar, 
Pierre Sprey and others strongly influenced the military thinking 
that eventually prevailed during "Desert Storm". 17 According to 
Colin Gray, "John Boyd deserves at least an honourable men-
tion for his discovery of the 'OODA [Observation-Orientation-
Decision-Action] loop' [ ... ] The OODA loop may appear too 
humble to merit categorisation as grand theory, but that is what 
it is. It has an elegant simplicity, an extensive domain of appli-
cability, and contains a high quality of insight about strategic 
essentials" .18 In discussing John Boyd one is reminded of Martin 
van Creveld's comment on Machiavelli in his survey of military 
"Richard G. Davis, The 31 Initiatives: A Study of Air Force-Army 
Cooperation, (Washington D.C.: Office of USAF History, 1987). 
17See for example Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and 
American Security, (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001). 
18Colin Gray, Modem Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 
pp. 90-91. 
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theorists: "The reason for including him in these pages is princi-
pally because he is there and because in other respects he is a 
commanding intellectual figure. Like a major general standing in 
the middle of the road, one must salute him whether one wants 
or not" .19 
Although Lambeth is predominantly concerned with 
American air power, he demonstrates both breadth and depth 
by including a discussion on how pertinent technology devel-
oped in the late 1970s was first tested with great success in the 
Israeli air operation against Syrian SA-6 and MiGs over the 
Bekaa Valley in June 1982. Operation Peace for Galilee is often 
forgotten when air campaigns of the 20"' century are considered, 
but the campaign was important on several accounts. 20 Israeli 
supremacy in the field of electronic warfare meant that Syrian 
forces that sought to give battle were blinded and consequently 
collectively destroyed. The Israeli Air Force, having used drones 
to read Syrian radar signatures, used four Hawkeye 
A W ACS/ESM and four E-3 ECM/ELINT aircraft both to jam 
Syrian radar and communications, and to direct strike aircraft 
into battle with great success. Moreover, secured voice and data 
links improved command and control considerably. Lessons 
from the Lebanon experience in mastering the highly developed 
air defence system, including the low-altitude environment, 
combined with Operation Eldorado Canyon, the limited air 
attack against Libya in 1986, gave the USAF confidence in the 
fact that it had managed to move beyond the bedraggled state of 
which it found itself in South East Asia a couple of decades ear-
lier. 
Operation Desert Storm and the Post-Cold War 
Era 
In his chapter titled "Desert Storm Revisited" Lambeth provides 
an informative and analytical review of the 1991 air campaign 
"Martin van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought, 
(London: Cassell & Co, 2000), p. 73. 
20See H.P. Willmott, "When Men Lost Faith in Reason", draft, 1999, 
chapter V, pp. 14-15. 
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against Iraq. Rather than dwell on basic facts he discusses the 
meaning and implications of those events. The author discusses 
how the air campaign was conceived, and in the process it be-
comes apparent that it did not resemble the Cold War inspired 
contingency plans for the region or the existing military doc-
trine. 
Lambeth argues that the strategic attacks against Bagh-
dad contributed to create friction, disorientation and confusion 
to the degree that Iraq's capacity for collective action was se-
verely reduced, but he disagrees with the advocates of strategic 
bombing that the attacks on regime targets themselves had any 
significant effect on the Iraqi leadership's decision-making proc-
ess. Rather, the author argues, the significance of the bombing 
resided firstly in the gaining of air control through negating the 
Iraqi air defence system and neutralising Iraqi air power, and 
thus depriving the Iraqis of any defence or situation awareness, 
and secondly, by enabling an attack on an enemy army whole-
sale with virtual impunity.21 Lambeth maintains that air power's 
degradation of Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwaiti Theatre of 
Operations (KTO), including the Republican Guard, was far 
more influential in achieving the national objectives than the so-
called strategic air campaign against regime targets in Baghdad. 
Lambeth's analysis is roughly in consonance with Gen-
eral Horner's view, but there are several observations that might 
strengthen the case for "independent" air operations against 
leadership targets. Many elements of Saddam Hussein's leader-
ship were forced to relocate and shift to back-up communica-
tions, the Iraqi leader's ability to communicate with his own 
population and military forces was considerably reduced, and 
the Baath Party's grip on power was temporarily loosened. As 
mentioned elsewhere, the Baath Party was not able to prevent 
an unprecedented level of desertion, ordinary Iraqis were sud-
denly willing to criticise their leader openly, and there was a 
bloody Civil War following the end of the Gulf War. The 
bombing of regime targets, although limited, left large parts of 
Baghdad in a vacuum, as parts of the security and intelligence 
network for the moment focused on their own survival rather 
21Lambeth (2000), p. 117. 
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than the protection of the regime. The concurrent operations 
against leadership targets provided a factor of uncertainty and 
element of resolve that is difficult to account for, but the confu-
sion and disorder certainly undermined the effectiveness of the 
Iraqi leadership. Although the 850 strikes against leadership and 
C3 targets were not comprehensive enough to ultimately change 
the Iraqi leadership, it is fair to argue that bombing of strategic 
targets made a worthwhile contribution to Desert Storm's ulti-
mate outcome. It was of course, in the end, the combination of 
attacks on the Iraqi war-making and war-fighting capabilities 
that gave the Coalition its unique leverage in arms. 
Nonetheless, Lambeth provides a comprehensive expla-
nation of the importance of Suppression of Enemy Air Defence 
(SEAD) operations on the one hand and the significance of 
combining JSTARS with precision engagements on the other.22 
That combination enabled an impressive "tank plinking" opera-
tion, and together with Push CAS and other tactical and opera-
tional procedures the Iraqi defeat was inevitable prior to the one 
hundred hour ground battle.23 
Although Desert Storm was a watershed in modern 
American military history, the author argues that there were 
several important problems in terms of air tasking, air-ground 
co-ordination specifically and joint operations generally. Al-
though all the US services accepted in principle the need for a 
single air commander there was continuous strife over alloca-
tions. The corps commanders preferred assets for their own area 
of responsibility rather than the second and third echelons of 
Iraqi forces that General Schwarzkopf considered most impor-
tant. An extension of such disagreements resulted in "arm-wres-
tling" over the proper placement of the Forward Support Con-
trol Line (FSCL), and consequently the argument is put forward 
22]ST ARS is short for Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. It 
identifies tanks, artillery and movement on the battlefield. It does for the 
ground picture what AWACS does for the air picture. 
23Push CAS is, according to General Charles A. Horner, "that aircraft 
would be designated for [Close Air Support] CAS , but where, how, and 
when they would be used would be determined "on the run" by events in 
the field". See Tom Clancy with General Chuck Homer (Ret.), Every Man a 
Tiger, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1999), p. 22. 
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that the Army's obsession with extending the line prohibited the 
USAF from conducting strikes that would possibly have pre-
vented the Republican Guard's escape. The author provides 
different sides of that story and other disputes, and concludes 
the chapter with emphasising how air power came of age in 
1991 although there are many caveats and qualifications that 
have to be considered carefully before one generalises about the 
overall utility of air power. One possible caveat for the future 
would be to believe that Saddam Hussein's actions and reactions 
represent future adversaries. The Iraqis were for example not 
able to take advantage of the fact that the large ground organi-
sation of a modern air force is its Achilles' heel, and arguably 
Saddam Hussein made several military/strategic decisions during 
the battles that favoured the Coalition. 
While technological progress was vindicated in 1991 the 
author next discusses the operational impact of stealth through-
out the decade, including the advent of B-2. Lambeth explores a 
new generation of munitions, allowing for accurate through-the-
weather ground-attack capabilities, and discusses the formal 
shift from a nuclear to a conventional bomber force that took 
place with the disestablishment of the Strategic Air Command 
(SAC) and the Tactical Air Command (TAC) in June 1992. The 
author demonstrates the improvements found in technology, 
which have been part of shaping the operational concepts for 
the Post-Cold War era, and as American bases world-wide are 
being severely reduced he speculates that the future might bring 
more attention to an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF). In evalu-
ating operations in Bosnia, the author states that "Deny Flight" 
was a near disaster and "little more than a costly exercise in 
converting jet fuel into noise", 24 while Deliberate Force was a 
clear success and a good example of coercive diplomacy work-
ing with air power. As with the Israeli surprise attack on the 
Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981, it provided a clear case 
where air power was used not to win a war, but rather to 
achieve limited objectives. The combination of increased artil-
lery fire, the credible threat of a ground attack and the diplo-
matic pressure played important parts in driving the Bosnian 
"Lambeth (2000), p. 179. 
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Serb leadership to the negotiation table, but as Richard Hol-
brooke stated in his book, the air campaign made a "huge dif-
ference" in helping bring about the Dayton accord. The interac-
tion between diplomacy and bombing is still under-researched, 
but one might speculate that it was in fact Milosevi~'~ conces-
sions in 1995 that persuaded large parts of the US pohticallead-
ership in 1999 into believing that Milosevic would give up Kos-
ovo after only three days of bombing. 
Operation Allied Force and Beyond 
Lambeth discusses the three phases of Operation "Allied Force" 
by looking into what worked and what c~used probl_ems. The 
first phase intended to soften the Yugoslav mtegrated atr defence 
system, but although the B-2 and other aircraft performed su-
perbly, the Yugoslavs wer~ highly p~ofessional a~ far as surface-
to-air missiles and anti-atrcraft-arttllery operations were con-
cerned. They did not disclose their positions easily _and althou~h 
NATO managed to gain air superiority there remamed a certam 
threat to the pilots throughout the campaign. The Serbs were 
extremely good at imitating tanks and artillery with milk carton 
material and wood-burning stoves, and to this day the Serbs' 
ability to disperse and hide equipment is not known. The author 
presents theories on how the F-117 was . shot down a_nd he 
makes the pertinent point that when no fnendly casualties be-
comes accepted as a goal of strategy, then one is judged ~y ?n-
reachable standards in this human endeavour of fog and fnction 
called war. One becomes a victim of one's own success and at 
best it makes for an inefficient air campaign, as one operates in 
an environment where civilians and soldiers are mixed. 25 
The second phase envisaged attacks against military tar-
gets below the 44m parallel. Despite the escalation the intensity 
of effort averaged merely fifty strike-sorties a night throughout 
the first week. Without a ground threat, however, the Serbs 
25 According to General Short there was no defined Fir~ Support Co-
ordination Line (FSCL) in the war over Kosovo. See Lieutenant General 
Michael C. Short, "An Airman's Lessons from Kosovo", in John Andreas 
Olsen (ed.), From Manoeuvre Warfare to Kosovo?, (Trondheim: The Royal 
Norwegian Air Force Academy, 2001), p. 264. 
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could disperse their ground forces in Kosovo, and with short-
comings in the intelligence cycle time combined with escalation 
on ethnic cleansing the Alliance came under severe criticism. The 
Apache fiasco is discussed, as are the collateral damage incidents 
that dominated the news, and thus influenced the choice of 
strategy. 
The third phase included attacks directly on Belgrade. 
This was kept as a last resort for political reasons, and when it 
finally found acceptance it was halted by the unfortunate de-
struction of the Chinese Embassy. As with the al-Firdos incident 
in 1991, which was also an intelligence error, the strategic air 
campaign was halted for a period of time and the much-needed 
momentum was lost. The larger point which the author makes is 
that "tactical mistakes" may have "strategic implications", and 
with war being a continuation of politics by other means the 
larger geopolitical issues will and should always prevail. The 
author adheres to the view of Philip Meilinger and Tony Mason 
that airmen have to accept that air campaigns originate in a 
political situation, and thus the political considerations will al-
ways govern the choice of strategy. Lambeth furthermore dis-
cusses why Milosevic chose to give up in the end, the problems 
of interoperability, the problems of decision-making in such a 
diverse alliance and the dispute over strategy that occurred be-
tween Lieutenant General Michael C. Short and General Wesley 
Clark.26 In essence Short argues that because of all the compro-
mises that had to be made in both planning and executing the 
air campaign it was in the end a "victory by happenstance 
rather than a victory by design". 27 
The debate on "centres of gravity" has to a large extent 
focused on whether it is the political leadership commanding 
war, or the military forces occupying territory. In 1991 Colonel 
Warden was the strongest advocate of the former, and in 1999 
Lieutenant General Short continued that line of argument. In an 
26Dana Priest, "Air Chief Faults Kosovo Strategy", The Washington Post, 
22 October 1999. See also John A. Tirpak, "Washington Watch: Short's 
View of the Air Campaign", The Air Force Magazine, 82, vol. 9, September 
1999, pp. 43-49. 
27Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, "An Airman's Lessons from 
Kosovo", p. 258. 
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attempt to "untangle" the air power debate Lambeth argues 
that those who focus on whether strategic bombing works, or 
whether air power can win wars single-handedly, are in reality 
approaching straw-men that will not provide useful answers in 
providing a vector for the future. Moreover, the battle over re-
sources and doctrine is so linked to parochialism that no service 
is really capable of moving beyond their own concepts of opera-
tions and terms of reference. The author is certainly right in 
arguing that "the most enlightening view is the eclectic one that 
argues for avoiding formulaic, single-recipe solutions to the ex-
clusion of all others" .28 
Air Power Transformed and the Future 
Lambeth provides an informative discussion on the possible 
synergy of air and space power in the near future. He argues 
that they are still considered as two separate professions with 
different cultures and that there is a lack of understanding be-
tween the two parties, but integration between the two has 
proved ever more successful after 1991. The spectrum of space 
missions includes space support, force enhancement, space con-
trol and force application, but the doctrinal work in the sphere 
is often seen as unrealistically visionary within the air power 
environment. There were, nevertheless, several space contribu-
tions to the Gulf War that are often forgotten or taken for 
granted. The Navstar global positioning system (GPS) came of 
age in Desert Storm, satellites were crucial in enabling the com-
mand, control and communication network that was used, and 
the space surveillance system proved important in dealing with 
the Scuds. 
In the last chapter Lambeth concludes that improved 
battle space awareness, heightened aircraft survivability, in-
creased weapons accuracy and improved understanding of con-
cepts of operation witnessed today have made it possible for air 
power to achieve strategic effects without having to mass num-
bers. If, however, the promise of air and space power outlined in 
this book is to be realised in the future force posture, the author 
21Lambeth (2000), p. 298. 
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suggests several recommendations that must be adhered to. 
F!rst, air power proponents must candidly acknowledge what 
mr P<;>wer cannot do, and moreover, "to argue for an aerospace-
c~ntnc U.S. defence strategy for all occasions is possibly the 
smgle most self-destructive error that air power proponents can 
make" .29 Second, airmen must accept that achieving and main-
taining air superiority is a means to an end and that it does not 
amount to achieving a military victory. Third, airmen must un-
burden them_selves with the ,belie! that urban-industrial bombing 
can undermme the enemy s will to fight to the degree that 
bombing alone can win the· war. Fourth, air power theories 
must be developed for attacking ground forces, rather than re-
lying on a reductionist attrition approach of destroying as many 
tanks and artillery pieces as can be seen. Fifth, airmen should 
convince their military colleagues what air power can do for 
them. Sixth, one has to redefine or specify what the terms "win-
n!ng" and •:victory". actually mean: "This canonical image of 
Victory entails defeatmg an enemy's ground forces in detail oc-
cupying hi~ territory, and controlling his population on an o~en­
~nded basts. Yet the latter two of these objectives are rarely 
likely ~o b_e goals of any U.S. joint operation".3° Finally, in order 
to mamtam the leverage of the air weapons one must continue 
~o _explore the mixture of advancing equipment, operational 
mstght and theoretical foundations for operations. One might 
also add that doctrine consists of theory, history, technology 
and culture, and that the latter has essentially been neglected in 
the design of air power strategies throughout the century.31 
Overall Assessment 
La~beth's thesis is that the exploration of stealth, precision and 
the mcreased use of space, such as global positioning system, 
amounts to a "transformation" in US air power. There is no 
doubt that there has been a transformation in combat effective-
ness, and that air power has become the first choice for policy 
29Lambeth (2000), p. 307. 
'"'bid., p. 312. 
311a~ MacFarling, Air Power Terminology, second edition, (Canberra: 
Aerospace Centre, 2001 ), p. 34. 
f 
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makers. One should, however, take note of the fact that precise 
targeting does not equal precise military or political effects, and 
the author does well in stressing that air power is ultimately but 
one part of an overall joint-operation package. There are inter-
estingly two sides of the coin, as observed by Mark Clodfelter: 
The implication might well be that the changes in American air 
power have altered the way a future adversary will fight, so that 
air power's capabilities are minimised.32 Be that as it may, at the 
end of the day, warfare is after all a land-based problem. 
Lambeth's main argument nevertheless stands scrutiny: 
American air power has been transformed over the past two-
three decades to a point where it has become strategically realis-
able outside the Cold War paradigm. Air power has a relative 
advantage in its relationship to the other elements of military 
force in the sense that it can influence the outcome in part be-
cause of stealth, precision and information dominance on the 
one hand and speed, range and flexibility on the other. Still, 
Lambeth does well in not arguing that the technological changes 
have amounted to a revolution in military affairs (RMA}. In-
deed, the author does not use that term RMA, or "information 
warfare", but nevertheless illustrates how technological im-
provements have altered the conduct of war and improved the 
effectiveness of air operations on the tactical, operational and 
strategic levels of command. Lambeth's work is a highly rec-
ommended survey for better understanding of how air power 
can provide other elements of force with cost-effective leverage 
that subsequently increases the chance for successful outcomes 
in contemporary conventional conflicts. 
One could of course criticise the author for not having 
accounted for the technological improvements of the other ser-
vices, but it may well be that technology has not increased the 
real preponderance of land power and sea power. Armies in the 
future will have flanks, but whether they will be able to add 
depth is quite another matter, and navies seem often to be sub-
ordinate to armies in waging and winning wars. In conclusion it 
seems as though the traditional combined-arms ground offensive 
32Mark Clodfelter, Book Review: "The Transformation of American Air 
Power",Joint Force Quarterly UFQ), 22 March 2001. 
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has witnessed a paradigm shift, where the organic army assets of 
tanks and attack helicopters play a more subordinate part to 
fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned vehicles than previously. The 
Pentagon's research on futuristic "space bombers" that could 
destroy targets on the other side of the world in thirty minutes 
strengthens Lambeth's conclusion. 33 
"The Transformation of American Air Power" is pri-
marily written for policy-makers who require a greater apprecia-
tion of the technical and doctrinal issues involved in the applica-
tion of air power, and secondly for the general audience who is 
interested in air power and defence matters. It is based on sec-
ondary sources rather than archival documentation and pro-
V:ides in summary a comprehensive, well-articulated and percep-
tive survey. The case studies and cogent explanations are of high 
scholarly quality with substantial footnotes and interesting anec-
dotes, and the author's ability to use history, technological data 
and conceptual insight when drawing the big picture is nothing 
le~s than praiseworthy. 
"See for example "U.S. Looking At Spacecraft As Bomber", Los Angeles 
Ttmes, 28 July, 2001, p. 1. For a different perspective, see for example Barry 
R. McCaffrey, "Cutting Ground Forces is Dangerous", Commentary, 1 
August 2001. 
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Chapter Ill 
Shaun Clarke: Strategy, Air 
Strike and Small Nations 
(1999) 
The Current Air Power Debate 
Air power has in the last decade increasingly become the ~ro­
found instrument of choice for American and European pohcy-
makers in dealing with recalcitrant regimes. 34 It was the princi-
pal means of military force in Operation Desert Storm (1991) 
and the only one in Deliberate Force (1995), Desert Fox (1998) 
and Allied Force (1999).35 Russia used air power extensively 
l4This review is a reprint of John Andreas Olsen, The Royal Air Force Air 
Power Review, Volume 4, Number One, Winter 2001, pp. 127-133. 
Js"Deliberate Force" was a 42 day air campaign conducted by NATO 
against the Bosnian Serb Army between 30 August and 20 September 1995, 
involving 3,500 sorties against 56 target complexes, parnc~l~rly supply 
dumps, with the result that the Serbs returned to the ne~ottatton_table . 
(Dayton Peace Accords); "Desert Fox" was a 70 hour a1r camp~tgn agamst 
tbe Iraqi regime between 15 and 18 December 1998 encompassmg 650 
sorties against 99 targets with the mission to strike military and sec~n~ 
targets in Iraq that contribute to Iraq's ability to produce, store, mamtam 
and deliver Weapons of mass destruction; and "Allied Force" was a 78 day 
air campaign conducted by the 19-member NATO Alliance against 
Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic's forces oc~upying K~so~o and 
Serbia proper between 24 Marcb and 10 June 1999 With the obJeCtiVes of 
stopping the Serb offensive in Kosovo; forcing a withdr~wal of Serb tro~ps 
from Kosovo; establishing democratic self-government m Kosovo; all~wmg 
a NATO-led international peacekeeping force into Kosovo; and allowmg the 
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against Chechnya (1994-1996) and no-fly zones have been 
implemented against Bosnia and Iraq throughout the 1990s. 36 
Political leaders and military commanders around the world 
seem to find air power an unusually tempting instrument of 
force, as "it appears to offer the pleasures of gratification with-
out the burdens of commitment". 37 Air power seems not only to 
offer the prospect of decisive action without accompanying risk 
of unacceptably heavy casualties, but also has the additional 
attraction of being relatively easy to control in terms of applica-
tion and degree of intensity. As a result, political and military 
commanders now consider air power as a central component to 
complex international problems. Despite air power's augmented 
role in crisis management, its employment has been shrouded in 
controversy and certain analysts contend that air power is not 
widely understood even among professional military officers. 38 
The remoteness associated with air power may be one factor, 
but the difficulty in measuring the erosion of an adversary's 
political resolve seems to discourage qualitative diversity within 
the air power debate. 
The current debate is, nevertheless, in reasonable shape, 
as two contemporary air power theorists define their concepts in 
clear terms.39 Colonel John Ashley Warden III had the unique 
safe and peaceful return of Kosovar Albanian refugees. On Allied Force, see 
particularly General Wesley K. Clark, "The United States and NATO: The 
Way Ahead", Parameters XXIX, No. 4, (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 2-14, and 
on objectives particularly, see Willi~m Clinton, "Statement of Objectives", 
24 March 1999, quoted in Air Force Magazine 82, No. 8, (August 1999), p. 
66. 
36Benjamin S. Lambeth, Russia·s Air Power In Crisis, (Washington DC: 
Smithsonian Institution, 1999), pp. 117-144. 
37Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power 
in the Persian Gulf, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 
213. 
"Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger (ed.), The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of 
Airpower Theory, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 
1997), p. ix. See also Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of US Air Power", 
Foreign Affairs 73, No. 1, (January/February 1994), pp. 108-123; and Colin 
S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1996), pp. 55-82. 
39See Robert A. Pape, "The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power", Security 
Studies 7, No. 2, (Winter 1997/98), pp. 93-114; Barry D. Watts, "Ignoring 
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opportunity of articulating an air power concept that witnessed 
execution. He was the main architect of the strategic air cam-
paign against Iraq in 1991, and through subsequent articles he 
argues consistently that air power is best applied directly against 
the enemy regime's political leadership. Warden argues that one 
should attempt to paralyse the enemy's ability to wage war by 
concentrating attacks on key targets vital to the regime's sur-
vival. Robert Anthony Pape has seriously challenged the whole 
notion of strategic attacks, favouring short-range theatre air 
attacks that seek to thwart the enemy's military strategy in the 
theatre of operations. He argues that interdicting supplies to, 
disrupting the movement and communication of, and destroying 
forces in the field rather than attacking an opponent's political 
centres is the key to winning wars. 
While Warden argues that incapacitating the political 
leadership is essential in an air campaign, Pape argues that one 
should focus on the enemy's ground forces on the battlefield. 
Both use Desert Storm to argue their case, since that campaign 
included both a strategic and a tactical dimension. These two 
views are extremes on a clearly defined spectrum, and they tend 
to be the starting point for discussions on whether air power can 
or cannot do the job alone. While that question may well be 
relevant for the United States, it is not necessarily so for the rest 
of the world. The Americans can confidently expect to possess 
relatively large and technologically sophisticated forces in the 
near future, but for most of the world there are restraints, com-
mitments and vulnerabilities that have to be taken into 
consideration. Importantly, as one moves from war to conflict, 
or from "High Intensity Conflict" to "Low Intensity Conflict", 
Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies", Security 
Studies 7, No. 2, (Winter 1997/98), pp. 115-171; Colonel (ret.) John A. 
Warden, "Success in Modern War: A Response to Robert Pape's Bombing 
to Win", Security Studies 7, No. 2, (Winter 1997/98), pp. 172-190; Karl 
Mueller, "Strategic Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air 
Power", Security Studies 7, No. 3, (Spring 1998), pp. 182-238; and 
Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Bounding the Air Power Debate", Strategic Review 
25, No. 4, (Winter 1997), pp. 42-55. 
40 FORSVARSSTUDIER 5/2002 
the very nature of the confrontation itself may change.40 As 
such, it is hardly possible to simply adopt a miniature version of 
an American strategy. Thus, smaller nations have to look for 
solutions outside the American context, and moreover, no single 
air power strategy is feasible in all circumstances. Although 
discussions on air power theory, strategy and doctrine for small 
nations do take place in seminars at air power centres all over 
the world, it is still rare to find comprehensive analyses. Wing 
Commander Shaun Clarke is one such exception with his timely 
study Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations.41 This review essay 
aims at presenting his ideas, and discussing them in the wider 
context of the current air power debate dominated by Warden 
and Pape. 
A Discussion of Strategy, Air Strike and Small 
Nations 
Clarke argues that nations with relatively small air forces, that is 
air forces with less than approximately one hundred strike air-
craft, should consider strategic air operations as one of their 
functions.42 His thesis is founded on a discussion of the nature 
of strategic air strike, using samples from history to verify his 
point, and defining the concept of strategic bombing beyond the 
traditional terms of reference. The refined concept is applied to 
a discussion on coercion, resulting in a paradigm for small na-
tion air strike strategy termed "Strategic Persuasion Oriented 
Targeting (SPOT)". Thus, in extracting maximum value from 
modest means, "small nation strategic strike", he argues, may 
not be the oxymoron it first appears to be.43 The author con-
tends that strategic air strike is not defined by aircraft, weapons, 
mass or scale, or by the distance covered, or necessarily by the 
nature of the target, but by the objective of the mission. As such, 
40See Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, (New York: The 
Free Press, 1991). 
41Shaun Clarke, Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations, (Fairbairn, 
Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, 1999). 
42Shaun Clarke provides an appendix listing the air strike capability of 129 
nations. The list only accounts for aircraft, not missiles. 
43Clarke (1999), p. 2. 
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it is better defined by its effect at the strategic level of war, but 
more accurately he argues that one should define strategic air 
strike by the intended outcome. Strategic air strike is defined as 
"the direct pursuit of primary or ultimate political objectives 
through air power", and therein "high strategic order" focuses 
on the resolve of the enemy's supreme decision-making body, 
while "low strategic order" settles for more immediate military 
prospects confined to the battlefield. Clarke has a point when he 
argues that strategic effects can occur on different levels of war 
and, as such, "intention" is a better criterion for planning than 
"effect", but at the end of a successful day "intentions" and 
"effects" are two sides of the same coin. The difficulty resides in 
the problem of transferring physical destruction into the aspired 
political endgame, but detaching strategic air strike from the 
correlation of mass and scale is valid. In providing a synopsis of 
several campaigns throughout the century that includes strategic 
operations, three stand out as qualified within the means of 
small nations. Operation Babylon, the Israeli attack against an 
Iraqi nuclear reactor. in Baghdad in June 1981; Operation Eldo-
rado Canyon, the combined American attack on Colonel 
Muanmmar ai-Qaddafi in April1986; and Operation Deliberate 
Force, the NATO attack on the Bosnian Serb Army in the au-
tumn of 1995. Nevertheless, the validity of strategic coercion for 
small nations does not reside in these historical examples, but in 
our way of thinking. Clarke suggests three propositions that 
partly change the terms of reference on the traditional percep-
tion of strategic air power applicability. 
The first proposition states that "In limited war, small 
nations need not aspire to unconditional surrender or the col-
lapse of the enemy regime". Clarke acknowledges that wars 
have limited utility, or as Car) von Clausewitz states, "in war 
the result is never final".44 Studies of the many wars since the 
Napoleonic era of "decisive battle" suggest that military victo-
ries do not themselves determine the outcome of wars, they 
merely provide political opportunities, and even those 
opportunities are severely limited by political constraints and 
44Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (London: Everyman's Library, 1993), p. 
89. 
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restraints. 45 Not even in Desert Storm and Allied Force did the 
Coalitions declare unconditional surrender or the collapse of the 
enemy regime as their objective. Annihilation, capitulation or 
strategic paralysis is then, according to Clarke, not a prerequi-
site for conducting strategic air strikes. Rather than disrupting 
the enemy leadership's means, one should persuade him to make 
concessions. As such, Clarke brings in the coercive element to a 
larger extent than Warden does. Rather than incapacitate or 
isolate the enemy leadership with the intention of a coup or re-
volt that will in turn overthrow the leader, Clarke argues that 
one should be less ambitious, and offer the belligerent state a 
way out of the predicament. Thus, Clarke is in favour of a dia-
logue with the enemy, while Warden would prefer that the out-
come did not rely on the enemy's will. Warden argues that one 
cannot plan military operations that are dependent on the en-
emy leader's resolve, but according to Clarke small nations can-
not aspire to strategic paralysis whether they prefer to or not. 
"Strategic Paralysis" is about removing the actual capability of 
maintaining the offending policy, and as such it is just as much 
"brute force" as it is "coercion". Small nations, Clarke argues, 
have to seek the art of the possible, they have to look less ideally 
and more practically at the challenge, and as such it is about 
influencing the enemy and at best removing his resolve. In es-
sence Clarke offers a model where hesitation/reduction and 
concessions/negotiations are the desired outcomes, and therein 
strategic air strike will give the politicians the diplomatic lever-
age necessary to achieve the objectives. While strategic bombing 
has been used to destroy or "paralyse" the enemy leadership in 
the past, Clarke argues that one should "persuade" by allowing 
for less ambitious incentives. 
The second proposition states that "The ultimate subject 
of war is the supreme decision- making body". The argument is 
that the Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait, or the Serb forces sta-
tioned in Kosovo, were the manifestation, or the symptom, of 
45Michael Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive?", Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1, 
(Spring 1999), pp. 126·135. See also Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory: 
From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996). 
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the real problem, namely the Iraqi and Serbian political leader-
ships. It is at the end of the day the politicians who decide if and 
when to start and end a war. The political leadership is therefore 
the nucleus of a conflict, and although cultural and historical 
legacies complicate such simplicity, the war-making decisions 
rest with the selected few. One may take the logic one step fur-
ther: if the enemy regime represents the national resolve, then it 
might not be a question of breaking it's resolve, but merely 
making it irrelevant. In either case, all efforts should be directed 
against the enemy leadership. Although Pape agrees that war is 
about coercing the decision-making apparatus, he argues that 
only when regimes are convinced of the certainty of defeat on 
the battlefield will they comply with the demands made of them. 
Pape categorically states that no strategic bombing campaign 
has ever yielded decisive results, nor were any significant 
opportunities missed.46 Although one aspect of that debate is 
whether air power's utility lies in the tactical or strategic realm, 
there is a more philosophical aspect to it. Warden suggests vic-
tory on the battlefield is irrelevant to winning the peace for 
which the war is waged, while Pape argues victory on the battle-
field is a condition for victory and the necessary means to fulfil 
national security objectives. Warden's thesis is therefore diamet-
rically opposed to Pape's only as far as "means" are concerned, 
and not the ultimate "objective". Clarke does not go into this 
debate, but settles for the fact that all military operations should 
be directed to have the maximum impact on the decision-mak-
ing apparatus. 
The third proposition states that "The large nation issue 
of air power primacy is a distraction to the true root of air 
power success- joint strategy". One of the problems of strategic 
bombing is that advocates have often argued that air power can 
do the job alone. While seductive in its own right, it may easily 
confuse a "war" for a "campaign", and ultimately, by excluding 
a comprehensive and integrated military campaign, it cannot 
guarantee victory. Professors William S. Lind and Robert A. 
Pape argue that the problem with strategic air operations is that 
46Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, 
(lthaca: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1996), pp. 314-331. 
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they are executed separately from ground engagements, and 
thus, even though the enemy finds himself partly paralysed or in 
shock for a short period of time, he will soon adapt to the new 
circumstances.47 Consequently, only by going after the enemy 
ground forces in the occupied land can one prevail. While one 
has sympathy for Warden's argument, that strategic air cam-
paigns have always been compromised for parochial and politi-
cal reasons, and thus never really been given the chance to show 
their full potential, Clarke makes a strong case when he suggests 
that strategic air strikes add to a range of pressures that should 
be applied simultaneously against the enemy. It is, ultimately, 
the accumulated product of pressures on the supreme decision-
making body that results in change of policy. While joint strat-
egy is normally associated with combining all military services, 
there is something to be said for combining the military aspect 
with diplomacy. Strategic air strikes, more than any other air 
power mission, provide direct diplomatic leverage. The 
combination of "bullets and words" is often underestimated in 
the actual execution of an air campaign: the diplomatic game 
does not end when military action starts, as seen recently in 
Deliberate Force and Allied Force. 48 Moreover, the very exis-
tence of a strategic air fleet may well have a deterrent effect on 
the opponent. As a "force in being", strategic air power capabil-
ity has a role both in preventing war and in the conduct of 
operations. While "war is a continuation of politics by other 
means", many air power advocates would seem to strip the con-
cept of strategic bombing of its political context. The unprece-
dented accuracy .and destructiveness of air power today means 
that every bomb is a potential political bomb, and therefore air 
power needs to be considered in terms of both political and 
diplomatic perspectives. While Warden argues that air power 
can be decisive when applied in the strategic realm, and Pape 
"William S. Lind, presentation at the RNoAF Academy, 22 September 
2000; and Robert A. Pape, presentation at the RN oAF Academy 20 
September 2000. 
"Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, (New York: Random House, 1998), 
p. 94-111; and Jamie Shea, "Modem conflicts, the media and public 
opinion: The Kosovo example", Presentation at the Royal Norwegian 
Military Academy, 18 September 2000. 
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argues that all such applications have proved irrelevant in the 
past, Clarke argues that strategic air power should at least be an 
option. 
Having established these three propositions, Clarke next 
discusses the strategic air strike methodology in its relation to 
small nations, by building on Pape's taxonomy of four coercive 
strategies. Clarke discusses whether small nations should adopt 
a "punishment" or "risk" strategy, which tries to push a society 
beyond its economic and psychological comprehension, a 
"decapitation" strategy, which neutralises or isolates an adver-
sary's leadership, national communications, or other high value 
centres, or a "denial" strategy, which attempts to neutralise an 
adversary's military ability to wage war. Pape essentially argues 
that coercive mechanisms provide a better basis upon which to 
categorise air strategies than targets do,49 but as the argument 
develops Pape starts to equate each category with a common set 
of targets. Moreover, as his deductive reasoning progresses he 
excludes one option after the other, concluding that there is 
strong evidence in support of "denial" applied at the tactical 
level as the superior coercive sttategy. Clarke considers all four 
mechanisms at the three levels of war, but in the context of 
small nations, and without suggesting that one is always prefer-
able. He acknowledges that the four coercive strategies are easily 
distinguished on paper for analytical purposes, but that in real-
ity they overlap. By stressing that leadership-centred rather than 
military-centred approaches provide small nations with new 
leverage, he merges the strategic focus of Warden with the coer-
cive focus of Pape. After a discussion of various targeting theo-
ries and the caveats therein, Clarke explores the possibilities of a 
paradigm termed "SPOT bombing". It emphasises targeting the 
belligerent leadership, but it does not aspire to overwhelm, 
paralyse or even generate dominant tempo, as that is beyond the 
means of small nations. It is about persuasion and "high im-
pact", that is, discrete operations optimising the combination of 
shock, visibility and damage. 50 The author offers an orientation, 
49Karl Mueller, "Strategic Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of 
Air Power", p. 187. 
50Clarke (1999), p. 140. 
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or mentality, rather than a force structure, and since it merely 
adds a new dimension to air power options, Clarke argues that 
his thesis can be implemented without substantial changes in the 
current structure of most air force organisations. 
Clarke has developed a convincing and comprehensive 
argument for small nations to consider strategic operations as a 
central part of their military doctrine. There are, nevertheless, a 
few issues that deserve further attention. First, for small nations 
to buy bombers in addition to fighters is expensive, and it might 
well be difficult within the allocated budgets, but "swing"- and 
"multi" role functions might bridge that gap. Second, air strikes 
against high-value targets are likely to provoke retaliation, and 
thus an unintended escalation may well be the result. The whole 
of the argument pre-supposes that the state in question can con-
trol the terms of reference, set the agenda and act in exactly the 
way it wants. If a small nation is fighting a large nation it may 
not have the means to follow-up such attacks, and the whole 
endeavour might be counterproductive. In this context it would 
also be interesting to explore ones own vulnerability to the de-
scribed operation. Or, just as importantly, discuss how small 
nations can contribute to Coalition warfare: how likely is it to 
have circumstances in which a state with less than one hundred 
strike-aircraft might seek to act offensively alone? Third, there 
are problems within international law when it comes to non-
military targets, and one has to assume that future belligerents 
will mix high-value targets with sensitive elements of the overall 
society. Fourth, any given country has to assess its likely enemy. 
If it is a revolutionary guerrilla movement, a civil war scenario 
or a country without considerable high-value targets, then the 
utility of strategic air operations decreases. Moreover, some-
times one does not want to negotiate with the enemy; one needs 
to eliminate his means of threat. This is often the case with nu-
clear, biological and chemical production centres, and herein 
Clarke provides an opening by acknowledging that "fait accom-
pli" has its role in modern conflicts. Finally, even if it is a 
"classical war", would it be politically acceptable to execute a 
strategic offensive? Lieutenant General Michael C. Short was 
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prevented from using air power in the suggested fashion for 
political rather than military reasons in 1999.51 Still, Clarke's 
thesis might be more acceptable for politicians than going "for 
the head of the snake [Milosevic] on the first night".52 These 
reservations are fair, but Clarke does not argue that one is 
obliged to use the strategic air strike option. Indeed, if the risk 
assessment concludes that the chance for retaliation is huge, that 
it might breach international law or that it is not politically 
acceptable, then strategic air strikes should not be preferred over 
the "traditional" air power roles. Clarke makes his case about 
the feasibility and implications of a "SPOT bombing" approach 
based on deductive reasoning combined with a solid theoretical 
framework, and as such it adds to the list of air power options 
that could be included in military doctrines. "SPOT bombing" is 
an important tool as the erosion of leadership resolve is based 
on influence rather than elimination, but it does not do away 
with the problem of assessing the enemy's political power struc-
ture and the traditional difficulties related to human intelligence. 
Overall Assessment 
In conclusion with reference to the Warden-Pape air power 
paradigm, Clarke sides with Warden in the fundamental belief 
that strategic air power can make a difference. But by account-
ing for small-scale operations, he differs from Warden in that he 
does not believe strategic air power can inake the whole differ-
ence. Clarke sides with Pape on his analysis of the rationale and 
mechanisms behind aerial coercion, but he differs from Pape in 
believing that there is not a sole strategy with universal applica-
bility. Clarke argues that one might search in vain if looking for 
a single-handed decisiveness in air power, as it is really about 
improving probabilities of gaining some concessions. While 
Pape seeks a single solution within the choices of coercive 
51 Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, correspondence with author, 21 
October 2000. 
52Dana Priest," Air Chief Faults Kosovo Strategy", The Washington Post, 
22 October 1999. See also John A. Tirpak, "Washington Watch: Short's 
View of the Air Campaign", Air Force Magazine 82, Vol. 9, (September 
1999), pp. 43-49. 
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strategies (denial) and Warden seeks a selection of prioritised 
target-sets (the Five Rings), Clarke concludes that at the end of 
the day the only sure thing is that "every man has his price". 
Thus, one needs to understand the cost-benefit calculus of the 
enemy, subsequently search for what actually constitutes his 
"price", and determine whether one is willing to exceed that 
price by using military power. If there is political commitment to 
such a task, then strategic air power will add significantly to the 
required leverage. Strategy is all about creating the circum-
stances in which the enemy leader will change his behaviour, 
and as such removing the enemy leader from power is not as 
important as having him comply with declared objectives. There 
is importantly no aspiration to paralyse the enemy in "SPOT 
bombing", only irritate, cause personal sacrifice and ultimately 
weaken the leadership's resolve for offensive action. 53 
Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations is overall an im-
portant book on air power doctrine, strategy and theory within 
the context of small nations, as it examines the essence of strate-
gic bombing. It is not an exhaustive analysis of air power or 
doctrine, as it only deals with one aspect within a range of air 
power functions, but it is an essential contribution to strategic 
acumen, professional mastery and the overall defence debate. In 
brief, Clarke argues that the key to "high strategic order" air 
strike lies in understanding the mechanism of coercing the politi-
cal leadership, the advantages of joint strategy, and acknowl-
edging that limited wars are fought for limited objectives. 
Herein one must sensitively comprehend cause and effect rela-
53The implications of Clarke's thesis can be lifted to the grand strategic level 
of war. Take Scandinavia as an example. Norway and Denmark envision 
the defence of their territory as part of a NATO operation. Sweden relies on 
marginal defence: it assumes that it can only be attacked in the context of a 
larger conflict, and in such a case only a limited amount of force will be 
directed towards the Swedish homeland. Sweden sizes its armed forces in the 
context of that calculation. Finland uses a third model. It hol4s the opinion 
that there is a limit to what an adversary would be willing to "pay" for 
conquering parts of its country, and applied an armed force structure that is 
able to exceed that price. Clarke's thesis is aligned with the "Finnish 
model": a small nation that cannot depend on an alliance needs to define 
the price the enemy is willing to pay, and make sure that the perceived cost 
is contested. (I am grateful to Nils Naastad for this comparison). 
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tionships in a field of the non-linear and intangible, which 
necessitates intelligence that accounts for cultural, social and 
psychological aspects combined with the art of military strategy. 
In the end, the utility of air power has more to do with imagina-
tive and innovative thinking than with high technology and air-
craft, and countries like Norway, Denmark and the Nether-
lands, all involved in revising their air power doctrines, would 
therefore do well in thinking through Clarke's findings - in 
terms of both offence and defence. Rather than suggest one 
strategy that is most likely to work in all cases, Clarke suggests a 
coherent and holistic view within the reality of small nations. 
His thoughts are aligned with Warden's, in focusing directly on 
the political realm of war, but there is a big difference between 
targeting for paralysis and targeting for persuasion. The logical 
and deductive thesis is, in conclusion, educational as it encour-
ages lateral, creative and independent thinking, and one can 
only agree with Colonel Philfip S. Meilinger that it is currently 
"one of the freshest and most original books on airpower the-
ory" .s4 
"Phillip S. Meilinger, Aerospace journal, Vol. 24, No. 3, (Fall 2000), pp. 
119-120. 
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Chapter IV 
Peter W. Gray (ed.): Air Power 
21: Challenges for the New 
Century (2000) 
The Icarus Syndrome 
In seeking to understand the present state of air power thought 
and the related question of where it comes from, there are ~ 
numbe~ of problems that confound ready explanation. 55 
Accor~mg to Car!_ Builder, air power theory was a pertinent 
factor m .the establishment of the USAF as an independent mili-
tary_servtce, but the subse~~ent abandonment of air power the-
ory m the face of competmve means, such as missiles and nu-
c_Iear devices, and ends, such as deterrence and a tactical orienta-
tion to warfare, separated the USAF from those commitments 
that had ensured its creation in the first place. 56 In the 1950s 
and 1960s the USAF apparently shifted its focus from the 
~onceptual thinking of winning wars to the business of procur-
mg b1gger and faster aircraft on the one hand and merely 
55Th' . f 
. IS review o erer Vf· Gr~y (ed.), Air Power 21: Challenges for the New 
Century, Her Majesty s StatiOnary Office,London 2000 is a reprint of John 
Andreas Olsen, The Royal Air Force Air Power Review, Volume 4 Number 
Two, Summer 2001, pp. 98-106. ' 
"Car! H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in 
the ~volutton and Fate of the U.S. Air Force, 4m ed., (London: Transaction 
J>ublishers, 1998). 
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supporting the ground commander's scheme of manoeuvre on 
the other. 
Those decades produced some of the same problems for 
the RAF. One hypothesis is that the British adherence to the 
concepts of deterrence, gradual escalation and flexible response 
weakened the position of the RAF as a war-winning service, and 
when it chose to abandon combat helicopters following such 
limited engagements as the Malayan Insurgency it also weak-
ened its position as a war-fighting service. 57 When the RAF lost 
its nuclear capability to the Royal Navy's submarine force, be-
cause of technological imperatives, it next fell out of the first-
team category and found itself in a doctrinal and theoretical 
void. Although this explanation is too simplistic, one fact seems 
to have manifested itself: the military threat was changing rap-
idly, and both the RAF and the USAF had to keep pace with the 
changes, but in the process a conceptual understanding of air 
power was undermined. 
Military events in the . 1990s have reintroduced the 
importance of understanding air power in a wider context, but 
there are dangers in adhering too strongly to formalised con-
cepts, because theory and doctrine can easily become 
straightjackets. Indeed, faith may lend single-mindedness where 
doctrine becomes dogma and one situates the appreciation 
rather than appreciates the situation. Sir Michael Howard's 
observation on this theme is important: 
I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that what-
ever doctrine the armed forces are working on now, they 
have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it 
does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does 
matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the 
moment arrives. 58 
57Philip Anthony Towle, Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in 
Unconventional Warfare 1918-1988, (London: Brassey's, 1989). 
58 Sir Michael Howard, cited in Lt. Col. William F. Andrews, Airpower 
Against an Army: Challenge and Response in CENTAF's Duel with the 
Republican Guard, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 
1998), p. 3. 
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It is important to continue the quest for a holistic and 
comp~eh~nsive air power theory, and to formalise a concept for 
war-fightmg doctnne, but it is a long, ambitious and cumber-
some process. The prerequisite is to have reasonable insight into 
the environment in which air power is applied, and therein lies 
the foundati~n for adaptability, creativity and improvisation, e~en though It does not amount to a holistic theory in its own 
nght .. One approach to enhancing such understanding is to 
establish workshops where academia and military experts meet 
to discuss and .write about current and future challenges. 
The Director of Defence Studies (RAF) is such an at-
t~mpt where a seri_es of air power workshops have been held 
smce 1994. The first book deriving from this process The 
Dynan;ics of ~ir Power, discussed the evolving theory a~d air 
power s role m peace support operations and the second publi~a~on, Perspectives on Air Power, focu;ed on air power in 
a political, technological and military context. 59 The latest 
contribution in the series is Air Power 21, where professors Mi-
chael Clarke, Tony Mason and Philip Sabin contribute for the 
third time. Together with David Gates they provide a broad and 
cross-cutting context, while the others contribute to the current 
debate on air power by exploring specific topics in some 
depth. 
60 
The analytical standard of the essays makes them wor-
thy of considera~ion, as the peacetime airman's principle task is 
to prepare effectively for the next conflict. 
A Synopsis of Air Power 21 
There are several recurring themes in this collection of essays 
and the m?s.t profound are t!te importance of being able to oper~ 
ate ~oth J_mntly . and combmed, acknowledging that political 
consideratiOns :Wdl_alwa_y_s prevail in the making of strategy, be 
there a revolutwn m rruhtary affairs or not, and that one still 
"Andrew Lambert and Arthur C. Williamson (eds.), The Dynamics of Air 
Power, (Brackneli,Berkshire: HMSO, 1996); and Stuart Peach (ed.), 
Perspectwes On Atr Power: Air Power In Its Wider Context (London· 
HMSO, 1998). ' . 
60Gray (ed.) (2000). 
AIR POWER 2000 53 
does not know how to translate military success into the desired 
political end state. . . . . 
Michael Clarke discusses the greater political volatility 
in which modern high-technological air power operates. He 
argues convincingly that one is increasingly witnessing military 
conflicts in which national survival is not directly at stake, as 
one enters conflicts for indirect national interests, such as 
humanitarian operations, and consequently the political objec-
tives of any given coalition will be multiple. The perceptions, 
values and cost-benefit analysis will depend on the vast numbers 
of non-governmental institutions, public opinion, local actors 
with economic and political agendas and each government's 
international and domestic interests in any specific situation. 
Clarke warns that in the process of policy-making the decisions 
for engagement become intuitive rather than analytical, a?d 
whenever operational and political considerations do not com-
cide the latter will prevail. Clarke argues that modern air power 
can be applied as a coercive tool on both the operational _an.d 
grand strategic level of peace enforcement and war, but agam It 
must be within the political framework, which is "dominated by 
instinctive political imperatives that render other carefully cali-
brated cost/benefit projections essentially irrelevant". 61 While air 
power often has been a military instrument of the last r~sort, the 
instinctive calculus by political leaders in the future might sug-
gest that air power should be us.ed in situat~ons tha~ do not 
amount to war. There is a huge dilemma herem that air power 
becomes an ordinary extension of politics by other means rather 
than an extraordinary instrument that is only applied within 
strictly defined legitimate cases. M<;>reover, in _that ~roces_s of 
opportunism there is the danger of air power bemg miSaJ?phed. 
David Gates takes this aspect further from a different 
perspective and argues that now that air power appears t~ be 
the instrument of choice it can easily become a weakness, smce 
it undermines the synergy of joint operations that might be re-
quired to defeat future adversaries. He warns ~~ai~st airm:n's 
enthusiasm for seeking the panacea, because for all Its techmcal 
sophistication" there remain "insurmountable constraints on its 
61Michael Clarke in Gray (ed.) (2000), p. 8. 
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application". 62 Thus, air power must collaborate more closely 
with surface forces on the one hand and aircraft, helicopters and 
missile options must be integrated on the other, in order to pro-
vide politicians with optimal military leverage. Gates observes 
that the USAF is moving in the right direction as far as 
harmonisation of air power doctrine is concerned, as it stresses 
generic capabilities and competencies such as power projection, 
air and space control, precision engagement and the exploitation 
of information, rather than roles, missions and organisations. 63 
One point that receives surprisingly little attention in the current 
debate on air power is whether NATO members should special-
ise in order to complement each other. Gates touches upon these 
issues, and warns that although some air forces might be 
tempted to develop a niche capacity there are larger problems 
associated with such developments that have to be looked into. 
He further makes a case for missiles, as they do not put airmen's 
lives in danger and are politically attractive instruments for 
showing determination in low-intensity crises. Moreover, he 
agrees with Philip Sabin that aerodynamic missiles may be the 
preferred choice for inferior powers challenging the West. Air 
power is importandy presented first and foremost as a "force 
enabler", rather than an instrument capable of solving such a 
complex phenomenon as war on its own. It is immensely diffi-
cult to translate even precise targeting into the desired political 
objective, and in this process it is pivotal to realise that air 
power is an enabler for surface operations and diplomacy. 
David Caddick offers some sceptical perspectives on the 
role of air power in the RMA, by examining the concept from a 
historical perspective, and exploring how air power fits into that 
notion. He argues that technological improvements witnessed in 
the last decade do not amount to a revolution in military affairs, 
as such an achievement requires doctrinal and organisational 
changes of huge proportions that have not yet materialised. 
Caddick argues that although air power is an essential compo-
nent of the technological developments in speed, precision and 
62David Gates in Peter W. Gray (ed.) (2000), p. 23. 
63United States Air Force, Air Force Basic Doctrine: Air Force Doctrine 
Document, September 1997. 
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lethality, it is only the USAF that has pardy managed to imple-
ment the larger conceptual aspects. However, to believe that 
technological improvements will ever result in an orderly war 
would be an illusion. While one might prefer to bridge the gap 
between the USAF and the rest of the world, 64 he warns that "an 
over-emphasis on technology can unreasonably raise expecta-
tions about the tragic but inevitable destructive impact of mili-
tary force". 65 The thesis has interesting implications, as one 
tends to focus on the uniqueness of each service, in order to sell 
one's own product, and technology is a facilitator therein, but 
one also tends to forget the overarching factor of how "power" 
in the form of "violence" can be used to achieve the political 
end state. There is indeed much to explore on the linkage be-
tween technological improvements such as stealth, precision and 
stand-off weapons in their relationship to information warfare 
and the whole significance of battle space awareness therein. 
Although the ending of the Cold War has created opportunities 
for air power as a "force enabler" there arise, nevertheless, just 
as many restraints and constraints, and air power remains the 
art of what is politically possible rather than technologically 
achievable. Finally, one should acknowledge that every want is a 
weakness, and an adversary may well take advantage of the 
asymmetric warfare that the technological superiority of 
information-age forces lends. 
Philip Sabin identifies how underdogs have challenged 
their opponents in the past, examines whether these "tech-
niques" can be synthesised into a coherent counter-strategy and 
discusses the implications for Western planners. The techniques 
to counter the effects of enemy air superiority are categorised 
into "limiting vulnerability", "fostering restraint", "striking 
back" and "contesting information dominance". In examining 
the ultimate challenge, namely to translate tactical and opera-
tional advantages into an integrated overall strategy that can 
secure victory, he assesses asymmetry versus flexibility in the 
64Note that precision strike, stealth and stand-off weapons are in many ways 
the three capabilities that have driven the RMA, and they are more or less 
solely resident in US aerospace forces. 
"David Caddick in Peter W. Gray (ed.) (2000), p. 66. 
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structuring of forces, deterrence versus provocation in devising a 
coercive strategy and activity versus endurance in the under-
dog's conduct of military operations. Based on a range of 
historical examples Sabin warns that although these paradoxes 
often prevent tactical triumph from amounting into strategic 
relevance, it would be dangerous for the Western powers to 
continue mirror-imaging the enemy as a passive opponent. It is 
rare to find western analysts attempting to go beyond mere 
"red-team" hypotheses and his structured and well-articulated 
essay is an excellent starting point for an exhaustive study. It 
would be interesting to study, for example, Norwegian or other 
small Western nations' thinking concerning the classic potential 
threat from the East, and in that process acknowledge that an 
underdog can be technologically advanced. Finally, Sabin mutu-
ally supports Gates' argument that integrated air defence sys-
tems are likely responses to superior air power in the future. 
Timothy Garden provides some interesting thoughts on 
air power in a European perspective. He argues that although 
Europe has roughly the same resources as the United States it 
spends only half as much on defence, but more importantly, it is 
"currently trying to support far too large a number of regular 
forces, conscripts and reserves on too few funds". 66 Garden ar-
gues that European nations must work together at reorganising 
their military force from the present Cold War structure, where 
air power assets are designated for defensive and supportive 
roles in a short high-intensity conflict, in order to match and 
complement the United States. Using Operation Allied Force as 
a benchmark for likely future scenarios, where humanitarian 
aspects are at the centre, Garden suggests that each nation 
should specialise rather than generalise their air forces, and next 
generate these assets into a European "pooling system". The 
NATO AWACS force is one such example, and high dividends 
may be paid if one extends that model to include airlift, air 
transport, air-to-air refuelling, reconnaissance and search and 
rescue operations. These are roles that are expensive irt terms of 
equipment and training, but since they do not involve combat 
aircraft one's sovereignty is not compromised and thus it would 
"Timothy Garden in Peter W. Gray (ed.), (2000), p. 103. 
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to a larger degree be politically acceptable. The operational 
problems to such an integration are manageable, and by 
accounting for a European Union defence capability and 
suggesting near, medium and long term approaches to meet the 
new political challenges, Garden emphasises that these steps are 
not only politically feasible but necessary. The thesis is plausible 
as the 1990s bare witness to the fact that every nation found a 
niche within which it could contribute something important to 
the air campaigns in which it chose to participate. Moreover, 
the size of force contribution is only one factor in coalition 
operations, and not necessarily as important as the mere 
commitment of the participating nations. 67 The Europeans do 
not have the advantage of single-nation purchasing, and none of 
the Europeans can afford proper ECM investment, but an 
arrangement whereby each of the European nations contributed 
a number of ECM aircraft would mean that real capability was 
attained. There is, nevertheless,' a danger that some European 
countries choose not to fight in certain coalitions, and those 
countries may well have niche capabilities on which the overall 
alliance depends. 
Stuart Peach, in providing a brief overview of air power 
history from the perspective of command and control, is not 
convinced that there will be a smooth transition in meeting fu-
ture challenges. He questions contemporary understanding of 
command and control, arguing that although doctrines empha-
sise "centralised command and decentralised execution", the air 
commanders of Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force 
found themselves at tactical levels, facing the danger of focusing 
on target-lists and process rather than strategy, which is the true 
realm of generalship. Allied Force was not in accordance with 
the principles of "manoeuvre warfare", as the campaign was 
rigorously controlled and highly scripted. 68 Peach warns that the 
current concern with providing definition labels is at the expense 
"Richard P. Hallion, "Critical Aerospace Capabilities for Coalition 
Operations", paper presented at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, 
Trondheim, 7 February 2001. 
68William S. Lind, "The Origins of Maneuver Warfare and its Implications 
for Air Power", paper presented at the Royal Norwegian Air Force 
Academy, Trondheim, 22 September 2000. 
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of the true profession of arms that is so critical to enabling 
successful air operations. Moreover, as one deals with wars of 
"choice" rather than wars of "necessity", with all the historical, 
ethnical 'and religious complexities that often characterise a 
multinational operation, Peach argues that it will be increasingly 
difficult to allow other nations to accept either command or 
control of own forces on all levels of war. This might be the 
biggest challenge to Garden's thesis of an integrated European 
force, and when one adds Clarke's argument of multiple politi-
cal objectives in future conflicts the consequences of not 
contemplating a wider understanding of operational decision-
making becomes immense. Furthermore, in order to ensure opti-
mal decision-making at the strategic level one has to think 
jointly, where cultural differences apply, and finally the wr_ap-
time nature of information age warfare requires ever better s!tu-
ational awareness and judgement from the operational 
commanders. Such a focus requires insight into the nature of 
command in which the human function cannot be substituted 
by computers and procedures, and Peach suggests "air forward"· 
commanders who deal with day-to-day targeting and tasking, 
while the strategic command function would be carried out in 
remote multinational headquarters. 
While Garden looks at combined air power challenges, 
Mungo Melvin looks at the first part of the joint perspective, by 
considering underlying institutional, parochial and cultural 
problems that have limited air-land co-operation in the past. On 
the operational level he argues that there is an inherent lack of 
common approach to the planning and conduct of war, particu-
larly because of conceptual differences in the command and 
control of the respective forces, that next serve as a source of 
discord at the strategic level. Melvin argues that air power has 
become the preferred military instrument, as politicians are 
reluctant to commit ground forces to the battlefield, and since 
the modern battlefield is a mixture of combatants and non-
combatants, villages and cities. Thus, it becomes difficult to 
argue the case for ground forces when vital national interests are 
not at stake. Consequently, close air support takes second place 
to distinct air operations, but in accordance with the Gates-the-
sis, Melvin suggests that it would be a profound mistake to ne-
l 
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glect air-land co-operation, because one must be prepared to 
"mount all types of air operations in a given 'threat' environ-
ment" .69 In the quest for force synergy, one must move beyond 
the narrow notion of tactical air support to land forces and ap-
proach the challenge at an operational and strategic level where 
it is about support for each other in facilitating tempo. In this 
context the airmen's task would actually be to convince their 
army and navy counterparts that they need air power in order to 
do a better job: It is about joint training and mutual understand-
ing with an emphasis on how air power can shape the battle 
space environment. 
In accounting for the air-sea component of joint opera-
tions, Christina Goulter argues that there is a general failure to 
fully appreciate the role of air power in naval expeditionary 
warfare, by which she defines operations launched from the sea. 
She demonstrates through a number of historical examples the 
problems and advantages in each of the main phases of 
expeditionary warfare: "Transit to the littoral; fighting from the 
sea; and breakout from the beach-head"/0 She emphasises the 
versatility of air power's contribution to shaping operations and 
argues that potential adversaries, such as India, Russia and 
China, will have a major advantage over an expeditionary force 
through their dedication to anti-shipping squadrons. Goulter 
warns that Britain's decision to rely heavily on stand-off anti-
surface warfare may prove to be a serious mistake, because such 
a capacity is just as important in the future as it was in the Cold 
War. While air power is but one element of an expeditionary 
operation, it plays a critical role in all three phases and thus, in 
order not to compromise the effect of the operations, one can-
not afford to cut specific capabilities such as anti-surface war-
fare and anti-submarine warfare. She warns that the cost-reduc-
tion often associated with expeditionary forces, as an alternative 
to massive ground forces, is highly questionable as preparation 
requirements have increased. It would be interesting to combine 
some of these observations with Sabin's underdog-thesis, be-
cause expeditionary forces by nature are extremely vulnerable, 
69Mungo Melvin in Gray (ed.) (2000), p. 181. 
7
°Christina Goulter in Gray (ed.) (2000), p. 183. 
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within the enemy's reach and even old low-technology diesel 
submarines can cause substantial damage. While airmen often 
associate the third dimension with space, an adversary might 
find· great opportunities_in exploring under-water weaponry, 
and it would be worthwhile to consider expeditionary warfare 
beyond the naval framework. 
In the final chapter Tony Mason suggests that the 20m 
Century ended, militarily, with the Gulf War, and as the 1990s 
witnessed new international circumstances in which air power 
operated, he argues convincingly that the differences and 
similarities in previous wars require a re-evaluation of underly-
ing air power concepts and ideas. He offers interesting reflec-
tions on the experience from Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo, and on 
the latter he considers both the strategy and the political 
sensitivities. He argues that "gradualism" should be reconsid-
ered as part of a coherent strategy, as it provides diplomatic 
leverage towards the ends for which the campaign is waged. 
Moreover, it strengthens the flexibility of air power options that 
are required to meet expectations of the complex political 
environment likely to dominate future conflicts. Thus, 
overwhelming force "will not always be possible, desirable or 
acceptable" because of the larger political considerations that 
must be allowed to dominate the choice of strategy.71 Mason 
argues that air power contributes to the resolution of conflict 
through shaping the environment, distinct operations and 
supporting surface forces, and as one should emphasise effects 
rather than roles, he questions the functionality of distinguishing 
between tactical and strategic air power. To some extent the last 
paragraph summarises air power's challenges for the new cen-
tury: 
There can be no single template for the successful application 
of air power. The versatility of air power application is as 
wide as the spectrum of conflict itself and the range of politi-
cal objectives being pursued. There is now the need and 
opportunity to revisit some well worn ideas and construct a 
conceptual paradigm appropriate to many different scenarios, 
71Tony Mason in Gray (ed.) (2000), p. 222. 
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in which air power can sustain coercive diplomacy and be-
come a primary instrument reinforcing the ongoing political 
dialogue. Thereby, it may sometimes act distinctly and di-
rectly, with overwhelming strength or more gradually, against 
an opponent's will to resist. On other occasions it may shape 
an environment for others to exploit. Elsewhere, it may pro-
tect and enhance other forces. 72 
Overall Assessment 
To summarise the messages in Air Power 21: It is about re-
evaluating air power strategy, accepting that overwhelming 
force is not the only viable option; it is about realising that air 
forces must collaborate more intimately with surface forces and 
strengthen the combined arm; it is about moving beyond mili-
tary "mirror-imaging" and accounting for the enemy deceptions 
and perceptions; and it is about developing a profound 
understanding of the political sensitivities that are always associ-
ated with air operations, and the command and control chal-
lenges therein. The book is about political and military acumen, 
accepting that things have changed and a restructuring is re-
quired since the days of the Cold War, where unity of purpose 
and effort could be taken for granted. 
The essays offer apparently little contradiction and 
provocation, but rather reinforce each other's conclusion. Al-
though some "professional disagreement" would have been 
welcome - accepting that "truth has many faces" - the book 
provides genuine and perceptive air power insight, and as such 
encourages further studies of the consequences associated with 
air power as an instrument of choice. For example, air forces 
might suggest a substantial restructuring in order to become 
"leaner and meaner" within any given budget, but the conse-
quence would be closing existing air bases and other infrastruc-
ture throughout the country. Regional and local politicians 
would next find their income base substantially reduced and 
again the political agenda, intuitive or analytical, would domi-
nate at the expense of operational cost-effectiveness. Short-term 
expedients would prevail over any long-term or abstract 
72Ibid., p. 236. 
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consideration, and as air power is viewed as an instrument that 
can be used in "low-intensity-conflicts" it becomes the airmen's 
task to convince the politicians what air power cannot do. Air-
men may complain that they were not allowed to exercise the 
preferred air strategy in Operation Allied Force for political 
reasons, but it is partly a self-inflicted wound, as airmen have 
traditionally oversold their case. 73 After all, air power has lim-
ited influence on ground activities, as witnessed in Somalia and 
Kosovo; limited operational sustainability in the crisis area; lim-
ited night/all weather capability; and air power is vulnerable to 
enemy fire. Indeed, technological superiority does not win wars, 
as witnessed in Vietnam, and air power has an inherent lack of 
stamina, which has hardly been touched upon in these essays. 
Although missiles and integrated defence systems are mentioned 
as future problem areas for Western powers in several essays, 
none of the authors pay lengthy attention to them, and estimates 
are that twenty-one countries will possess the most advanced 
"double digit" SAMs, such as the SA-10/12 and -20, by 2005.74 
Non-western countries may not bother with the traditional 
manned air power platform approach, but concentrate fully on 
defensive and offensive missile systems. Small western states 
should also seriously examine such an option, and its conse-
quences for air power force structuring, as missiles are becoming 
increasingly more capable. 
Some chapters are inevitably more clearly articulated 
than others, but overall the analytical standard is impressive, 
and collectively Air Power 21 is worthy of attention. The book 
is useful in the process of developing a comprehensive military 
theory, as the fallacy of suggesting one-dimensional solutions to 
all future challenges has been avoided. If lcarus is to be fully 
saved, however, one might suggest an increased focus on the 
social mechanisms related to the use and nature of force, vio-
lence and power. As one moves into a new centuty, where low-
73Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, "An Airman's Lessons from 
Kosovo", paper presented at the Royal No"rwegian Air Force Academy, 
Trondheim, 28 February 2001. 
74Richard P. Hallion, "Critical Aerospace Capabilities for Coalition 
Operations", paper presented at the Royal Norwegian NI Force Academy, 
Trondheim, 7 February 2001. 
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intensity crisis may dominate and the United States may reduce 
its commitment to Europe, one can only hope that exploring the 
underlying nature of air power becomes the focal point in strate-
gic thought, and not the aircraft, be it manned or not. In that 
process it is imperative to contextualise air power, which is to 
consider it in its proper political realm with all the economic, 
social, psychological, public and diplomatic aspects that follow. 
As many air forces witness current institutional problems, the 
challenge is to enhance air power understanding at the strategic 
level, by focusing on vision and commitment to the true profes-
sion of arms. 
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Chapter V 
John A. Warden ITI & Leland A. 
Russell: Winning in FastTime: 
Harness the Competitive 
Advantage of Prometheus in 
Business and Life (2002) 
The Genesis of Winning in Fast Time 
In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, a 
small group of air power advocates in the Pentagon, the so-
called "Checkmate" office, proposed a conventional strategic air 
campaign to liberate Kuwait. 75 The group, which was under the 
direction of Colonel John Ashley Warden Ill, had one clear pur-
pose in mind: to force Iraq's army out of Kuwait by applying air 
power in a strategic offensive directly against the sources of 
Iraqi national power. The stated objectives were to "isolate 
Saddam; eliminate Iraq's offensive and defensive capability; 
incapacitate the national leadership; reduce the threat to friendly 
nations; and minimize the damage to enhance rebuilding". 76 
75This review of J.A. Warden lll & L.A. Russel, Winning in FastTime: 
Harness the Competitive Advantage of Prometheus in Business imd Life 
(Montgomery, Ala., Venturist Publishing, 2002) is a reprint of John Andreas 
Olsen, The Royal Air Force Air Power Review, Volume 4, Number One, 
Spring 2001, pp. 120-126. 
"Colonel John A. Warden, briefing to General Norman Schwarzkopf, 17 
August 1990, «Iraq Air Campaign Instant Thunder», p. 5. 
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Warden termed the concept "Instant Thunder", and as he sug-
gested that air power through stealth and precision could be a 
distinct war winning instrument, which if successful would rele-
gate armies and navies to secondary roles, it could be nothing 
other than controversial both within and outside the American 
military establishments. "Instant Thunder", as presented to the 
United States' military and political leadership between 9 and 20 
August 1990, was bold, imaginative and innovative, but not in 
accord with then current military doctrine and what was politi-
cally acceptable. Despite bureaucratic obstacles and conceptual 
opposition the "Checkmate" team prevailed through personal 
and collective dedication to the task, and an unrelenting persis-
tence to see through a change of focus in military planning. 
Rather than accepting that air power should be a subordinate of 
the ground commander's "scheme of manoeuvre", as suggested 
in the "AirLand Battle" doctrine at the time, Warden's team 
developed an offensive option where air power was envisioned 
to have a decisive pqlitical effect short of engaging ground 
forces. Whether the concept was operationally attainable as it 
stood in early August 1990 is highly questionable, but it 
changed the overall direction of planning. It met the require-
ments of an overall grand strategy, an underlying strategy for a 
set of operations, and importantly, a system approach to war 
was chosen. Together with then Lieutenant Colonel David A. 
Deptula and Brigadier General Buster C. Glosson, both of 
whom were in charge of the implementation, the "Instant 
Thunder" concept remained at the heart of what became the 
strategic air campaign - phase one - of Operation Desert Storm. 
The concept provided the American leadership with an offensive 
alternative that did not exist at the time, it gave the overall 
planning a strategic orientation and both Generals Norman 
Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell have credited Warden as the 
architect of the strategic part of the 1991 air campaign.77 
77Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1995), pp. 459-460; General H. Norman Schwarzkopf 
with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero, (New York: Bantam Books, 
1992), pp. 369-371. On the evolution of the air campaign, see for example 
Diane T. Putney, «From Instant Thunder to Desert Storm: Developing the 
Gulf War Air Campaign's Phases», Air Power History 41, No. 3, (Fall 
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The strategy was, however, not the result of an instant 
flash of brilliance. Warden had developed many of these ideas in 
his book, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, which was 
published in 1988.78 The work is a philosophical and theoretical 
framework for conceptualising, planning and executing an air 
campaign. It is about how one should go about winning an air 
campaign, focusing on the importance of air superiority and 
anti-surface operations on the one hand, and how to orchestrate 
an air force on the operational level of war by developing a 
strategic mindset on the other. According to Professor Dermis 
Drew, The Air Campaign was "hailed as the most significant 
theoretical work on airpower since the days of Billy Mitchell", 
and Professor Richard P. Hallion argues that the book "had 
profound impact on the American defence establishment" .79 
Although few dispute that ideas on modern air power are ele-
gantly expressed in the book, Warden has also been extensively 
criticized for being an air power zealot, for not using historical 
examples correctly in illustrating his conclusions and for not 
including alternatives to conventional inter-state warfare scenar-
ios.•• Be that as it may, by early 1990 Warden extended his the-
sis to include the "Five Rings Model".81 In brief, Warden argues 
that one could analyse the enemy as a system by identifying the 
state's "centres of gravity" - the leverage points within the sys-
tem - consisting of five concentric circles: isolate the leadership 
(decision making organ); degrade key production (oil and 
1994), pp. 39-50; and Richard G. Davis, Decisive Force: Strategic Air 
Power in Desert Storm, (Washington D.C.: Air Force History and Museums 
Program, 1996). 
"Colonel John A. Warden, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, 
(Washington D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988). 
79Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, 
(Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1992), pp. 115-116; and 
·Dennis Drew, "Vietnam, 'Wars of the Third Kind' and Air Force Doctrine", 
p. 15 (http://www.ttu.edu/-vietnam/96papers/vietsymp.htm). 
8
°For a condemnation of The Air Campaign, see Niklas Zetterling, "John 
Warden, The Air Campaign- en kritisk granskning", Kungl 
krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar ock tidsskrift, No. 1, 1998, pp. 107· 
130. (The text is in Swedish). 
111Colonel John A. Warden m, "Centers of Gravity: the Key to Success in 
War", unpublished memorandum, March 1990. 
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electricity); disrupt the infrastructure (railroads and bridges); 
"turn" the population and troops against the regime; and de-
stroy offensive and defensive military forces. 82 As technology 
allowed for parallel attacks, that is, multiple centres of gravity 
could be attacked simultaneously, Warden argued that by focus-
ing on desired political effect, rather than physical destruction, 
one could achieve a rapid victory at minimal cost. As such, The 
Air Campaign, the evolving "Five Rings" and the overall convic-
tion that the enemy should be treated as a system, was the gene-
sis of what became "Instant Thunder", and Warden had the 
rare opportunity of articulating an air power concept that by 
and large was put into effect. Although shrouded in controversy, 
his stature as an authority on air power theory has grown 
significantly in the 1990s, and he remains at the centre of the 
current air power debate."J He developed a new curricula 
through his position as Commandant at the USAF's Air Com-
mand and Staff College after the war, and his thinking has influ-
enced air power doctrines all over the world. 84 
82Colonel John A. Warden Ill, "The Enemy As a System", Airpower 
journal, Spring 1995, pp. 40-55. 
830n the controversy of John A. Warden, see for example Colonel Richard 
T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against 
Iraq, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1995); and 
Colonel Edward C. Mann, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the 
Airpower Debates (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 
1995). On the current air power debate, see for example See Robert A. 
Pape, "The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power", Security Studies 7, No. 
2, (Winter 1997/98), pp. 93-114; Barry D. Watts, "Ignoring Reality: 
Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies", Security Studies 7, 
No. 2, (Winter 1997/98), pp. 115-171; Colonel (ret.) John A. Warden, 
"Success in Modern War: A Response to Robert Pape's Bombing to Win", 
Security Studies 7, No. 2, (Winter 1997/98), pp. 172-190; Karl Mueller, 
"Strategic Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power", 
Security Studies 7, No. 3, (Spring 1998), pp. 182-238; and Benjamin S. 
Lambeth, "Bounding the Air Power Debate", Strategic Review 25, No. 4, 
(Winter 1997), pp. 42-55. 
84Warden's thinking has influenced air power doctrines all over the Western 
world - for example the American, Australian, British and Norwegian. 
More specifically, Denmark has explicitly endorsed Warden's five air 
superiority cases and the Five Rings Model. 
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A Synopsis of Winning in Fast Time 
Since his retirement form the USAF in 1995 he has applied the 
ideas of The Air Campaign, "Centres of Gravity", "the Five 
Rings Model", "Parallel Warfare", "Targeting for Effect" and 
"Instant Thunder" to the commercial world. Warden argues 
that at the grand strategic level, the strategies of war and busi-
ness have much in common, and through his new book, Win-
ning in FastTime, he sets out to explain a mindset and a method 
of rapid and decisive strategic action. Drawing on examples 
from the planning and execution of Operation Desert Storm, 
vied with stories of companies that have already adopted the so-
called "Prometheus Process", Warden and Leland A. Russell 
provide a new approach to business strategy in today's world 
that is worth consideration. The authors discuss principles and 
concepts that they believe are the key to successful operations in 
any kind of competitive environment, and the fundamental 
assumption is that one cannot merely react to change, or adjust 
through incremental improvements: one needs to act offensively 
and decisively by creating the future through outrhinking the 
competitors. "Instant Thunder" is Warden's basic formula for 
winning: "think strategically, focus sharply and move quickly". 
The following paragraphs will take a closer look at the core of 
Winning in FastTime. 
The key to success, according to the authors, is to think 
like a winner. For such a mindset to materialise, they suggest 
basic principles- the so-called "Prometheus Touchstones": cre-
ate a vision and implement it systematically: 
In today's warp-speed world, a new approach that accelerates 
strategic thinking and action is essential. To win, you must 
decide what you want your tomorrow to be, and then make it 
happen faster than the rate of change in your competitive 
environment. This is winning in FastTime. The Prometheus 
Process is a systematic and proven method for designing win-
ning strategies that is simple enough for everyone to grasp, yet 
sophisticated enough to plan, execute and complete projects 
of any scope and complexity. Prometheus includes a common 
strategic vocabulary that is shared across the organization. It 
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is also fractal, which means that the same process pattern can 
be repeated over and over at an ever-smaller scale. 
The approach is clearly derived from "Instant Thunder": what 
was "fast, precise and parallel operations" in the military world 
is translated into "think strategically, focus sharply and move 
quickly" in the world of business. This will next enabl~ a cha~ge 
of game, that is, one has to create one's own rules with a wm-
ning mentality, as the strategy, organisation and force structure 
of yesterday may not apply. In order to change the terms of 
references one needs a comprehensive understanding of the 
environment in which one is working, and therefore one must 
think of competitors and customers as strategic entities, or sys-
tems. It is a question of getting the upper hand, and in that 
process one needs to focus on the system's centres of gravity and 
next act on them rapidly and decisively. In order to change the 
overall system to your own advantage the authors have devel-
oped the Promethic Laws: 
Every action ~ffects the future; Specific actions create a spe-
cific future; Everything and every action happens in a system; 
All systems have inertia and resist to change; All systems have 
Centres of Gravity; Systems change when their Centers of 
Gravity change; The extent and probability of system change 
is directly proportional to the number of centers of gravity af-
fected and the speed of which they are affected; All known 
systems and things have a beginning and an end; and Specific 
actions produce specific ends. 
This is the theoretical linchpin from which the four imperatives 
derive: Design the Future, Target for Success, Campaign to Win 
and Finish with Finesse. 85 
85The figure is from Colonel John A. Warden, "Modem Competitiveness 
Theory", in John Andreas Olsen (ed.), Asymmetric Warfare, (RN oAF 
Academy: Trondheim, 2002), p. 217. 
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Imperative One: Design the Future 
The first imperative, design the future, depends on four steps. 
First one needs to assess the environment in which one is operat-
ing, that is, one needs to understand the broad technological, 
economic and political context of the market. The authors use 
the term "scoping the environment": although one cannot pre-
dict the future, one can identify the direction of change, question 
dubious assumptions, and therein acknowledge the opportuni-
ties and potential obstacles. It is about developing strategic 
awareness in order to be able to exploit the opportunities of 
chance, friction and fog, rather than being passive and defensive 
about inevitable changes. Having scoped the environment, the 
next step is to paint the future picture, that is, a clear and 
compelling description of where one wants to be at some point 
in the future. The future position should be a "constant beacon 
toward which everyone in the organization can steer", .and as 
such it is the most important step in planning the grand strategy. 
The authors stress that an "architectural" rather than a "brick-
layer's" view is an important point of departure. Based on "Key 
Descriptors", every company is advised to develop brief state-
ments about the prospects of the future, emphasising high-level 
outcomes in an optimistic, creative and specific way. "Open 
planning" is recommended since the key to steering in the right 
direction is that as many as possible feel that they are part of 
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defining the strategy, that is, they get the perception of purpose 
through active participation and ownership. When the destina-
tion is identified the third step is to engrave the guidance pre-
cepts. These are "behavioural touchstones", that is, short state-
ments about permissible behaviour as employees work at meet-
ing the firm's stated objectives. On the one hand issues of 
philosophical and operational importance should be stated, and 
on the other differentiation should be sought. The authors 
distinguish between prime directives and rules of engagement. 
The former is of a higher order, while the latter are to a large 
degree subject to change over time and new circumstances. The 
fourth and final step within the first imperative of the "Prome-
theus Process" is establishing measures of merit. While measures 
for tactical success may be easy to identify, the key is to measure 
the less tangible strategic effect. To win a battle or a campaign is 
one thing, to win the actual war is another, and finally to win 
the peace for which the war is fought is yet another challenge. 
The authors use the term "Go to Rome", reflecting on the fact 
that while Hannibal was quite successful at the "Battle of Can-
nae", he never exploited the advantage of that success and 
marched to Rome, something which would have given him the 
ultimate victory. The suggested approach to measure merits is to 
evaluate the results against the ends as defined by the "Key 
Descriptors" identified in the second step. Creating an inte-
grated measuring system is part of the motivation for having a 
strategy, and it links the day-to-day performance to the Big Pic-
ture. 
Imperative Two: Target for Success 
The theoretical foundation for "Instant Thunder" is the "Five 
Rings". The model is founded on the belief that the enemy can 
be treated as a system, and within that system there are several 
key targets ("centres of gravity"). By identifying these, one can 
either remove or add energy to the system in order to maximise 
the desired effect. In bombing a building one reduces the energy 
level by applying negative energy, while maintaining a Coalition 
is referred to as positive energy. As one attacks selected "centres 
of gravity" one can manipulate the situation, and in this process 
72 FORSVARSSTUDIER 5/2002 
the "Five Rings" is a convenient planning tool. The model is a 
simplification of the real world that helps provide an overall 
impression of what needs to be affected in order to arrive at the 
future previously defined. By looking at the competitors and 
customers as a whole, as a system, one acknowledges that 
interrelationships, rather than linear cause-effect chains, have 
practical utility, and one must consider the process of change 
rather than static snap-shots of the situation. Systems have 
enormous resilience, but by exceeding the system's "elastic lim-
its" one can achieve permanent change. The significance of such 
an exercise resides in the fact that if one does not get the strate-
gic targets right it becomes difficult to alter the system. It is not 
so much about doing "things right" as doing the "right things". 
Having identified the centres of gravity, the. task is to determine 
"which action will result in the greatest probability of having a 
real effect". Having understood the concept of effect-based 
targeting, the next step is to develop an action plan for each 
centre of gravity, ensuring the strategic linkage, that is, the 
connection between desired effects and the realisation of the 
future picture. The authors recommend six steps in creating this 
plan: define the desired effect, clarify the measure of merit, de-
cide the timeframe, gather meaningful and reliable information, 
develop high-level directions and estimate the resource require-
ments. 
Imperative Three: Campaigning to Win 
Having defined the desired effects and developed an action plan, 
the next challenge is to apply resources as effectively as possible 
to achieve them. Rather than approach the targets serially, the 
authors suggest parallel campaigns, that is, multiple centres of 
gravity should be attacked through multiple and simultaneous 
operations. It is not about relying on one decisive blow, it is 
about approaching several avenues that may lead to the desired 
change, and as such one does not depend on any single success, 
but the degradation of the overall system. It is essential that one 
accounts for the "time value of action", that is, the impact on 
those "centres of gravity" depend on the "velocity" of opera-
tions, where "velocity" is defined as "speed in the right direc-
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tion". In such a context the management needs only concern 
itself with orchestrating the campaign and timing, as opposed to 
the tactical and technical details. In order to ensure commitment 
throughout the organisation the authors recommend the 
"Three-Echelon Rule": have three organisational echelons pre-
sent during planning. It reduces confusion and strengthens mo-
rale. Through multiplicity and simultaneity the orchestrator 
must focus on momenrum, as the overall orientation is strategic, 
and as such he would need to take instant decisions without 
reference to higher authority. In order not to let enthusiasm 
overtake objective judgement, the authors recommend a "Red 
Team", that is, a team tasked with contesting the firm's assump-
tions and raising potential problems in advance. Another chal-
lenge in this context is the overall organisational structure. 
According to the authors one has to organise for success. New 
situations require new structures, and in order to maintain stra-
tegic flexibility one needs a dynamic organisation that accounts 
for new technologies. It is about being able to exploit the 
information faster than the competitors, and therein three pieces 
of advise are provided: "have an open attitude about informa-
tion, if the hierarchy slows you down, go around it; and avoid 
serial information dissemination". 
Imperative Four: Finish with Finesse 
While most firms and organisations stop the planning-loop at 
the stage of having implemented an idea or a strategy success-
fully, the "Prometheus Process" argues that one needs to con-
sider termination, the end game. In accepting that every cam-
paign, project or product must end at some point, the authors 
suggest that one does it properly and orderly- one should finish 
with finesse rather than leaving it to chance. It is about exiting 
on top with style, and as such one needs to define "exit points". 
The following criteria are suggested: maximise (and retain) 
financial gains; minimise losses by "failing fast"; and end the 
game while strong. 
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An Assessment of Winning in Fast Time 
Winning in FastTime culminates with the twelve Cardinal Rules 
of "Prometheus": Think Like an Architect, Execute Good 
Enough Plans, Be on the Offensive, Impose Your Plan, Do Not 
Underestimate What It Takes to Win, Choose Enemies and 
Friends,. Use an Indirect Approach, Stay out of the Balkans, Ex-
ploit Your Key Force, Maintain and Use Reserves, Focus on the 
Future and Bypass Obstacles. These rules are quite symptomatic 
for the book, which provides the reader with a set of guidelines 
and procedures for the road to success. It is seductive in its 
simplicity and it is elegantly written. It is in many ways 
Jominian, as is Warden's previous work, in the sense that it pro-
vides a recipe for success. Winning in FastTime will surely be 
criticised on that basis, as one can argue that there are few 
universal truths on how to succeed in war and business. But one 
should be careful not to dismiss it on such a basis, as the work is 
really more about a mindset and an orientation to problem 
solving than it is a checklist. It is about how to think strategi-
cally rather than tactically, it is about how to deal with the 
problem rather than the symptoms, and it is about thinking 
positively rather than complain about self-imposed restrictions. 
The challenge is to ensure that guidelines do not become 
straightjackets, and when entwined with creativity and foresight 
they are surely worthwhile having. Models simplify the real 
world, and in that process one might well lose some important 
aspects, but if used sensibly they enable you to think clearly, 
they provide a common basis for discussing important issues, 
and in the end they provide a tool that encourages further stud-
ies. The "enemy as a system" is an interesting perspective that 
invites two final comments. While some firms tend to focus on 
its "competitors" as the "enemy", the Warden-Leland sugges-
tion is to look beyond that and use the customers and their fu-
ture requirements as measurement criteria for progress. Impor-
tantly, when the firm starts to focus solely on the "competitors" 
it might already be losing. Moreover, if the bureaucratic system 
within a firm has problems complying with "FastTime", one 
may be able to work around the system initially, but in a wider 
sense, this might be the right time to "exit": it is an indication of 
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necessary change on both the individual and organisational 
level. 
Woven into the "Prometheus Process" is a rather 
comprehensive lexicon for communicating strategic issues 
throughout the organisation. "Open Planning", "Scoping the 
Environment", "Go to Rome", "Stay Out of the Balkans", 
"Velocity", "Centres of Gravity", "Instant Thunder" and "the 
Five Rings" are useful terms as they have explanatory value. 
Winning in FastTime is motivating reading and impressively 
coherent: the deductive logic is progressively applied throughout 
the work. The reader does not lose track of the strategic con-
cept, as the book is well structured and consistent. As such the 
"Prometheus Process" contributes to strategic awareness and 
strategic thought at a conceptual level, and next the common 
language and concrete action plans are sufficient for 
implementation. It is a business philosophy worth consideration, 
and as it accounts for the complete planning cycle it is rather 
comprehensive and holistic. It does not provide all the answers 
when it comes down to implementation, but it does ask many of 
the right questions. The defence establishment in Brirain, Nor-
way and other nations have applied a manoeuvre approach to 
warfare on the operational level of war. Such a philosophy 
needs a strategic orientation, and the "Prometheus Process" 
might very well contribute in providing the required framework. 
